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UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE: USING CONTRACT THEORY TO
INVALIDATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CLAUSES IN FIXED-FEE CONTRACTS
Jacqueline McMurtrie*
Indigent defense remains in crisis and yet constitutional challenges to promote sys-
temic change have met with mixed success. This Article explores the new strategy of
applying contract theory and principles to challenge indigent defense contracts
that violate the canons of professional responsibility. This Article begins by discuss-
ing the author's experience working on cases of indigent defendants whose
convictions were overturned through the efforts of the Innocence Project Northwest.
The erroneous convictions were facilitated by the indigent defense contract in place
at the time of the convictions. Pursuant to this contract, the indigent defense con-
tractor agreed to provide representation in all criminal cases in the county for a
fixed price, and to hire and pay for conflict counsel out of the lump-sum fee. This
Article discusses why such a contract creates multi-faceted conflicts of interest be-
tween the contracting attorney, conflict counsel, and their clients. Since these
conflicts are too grave to waive through the process of informed consent, the provi-
sions of the contract are unconscionable, and violate the public policy encompassed
in the canons of professional responsibility. This Article suggests that bar associa-
tions are uniquely situated to use the principles of contract law to challenge
indigent defense contracts that violate the rules of ethics by their very terms.
INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
not fulfilled its promise of guaranteeing indigent defendants their
right to receive capable representation.' Nor has the Sixth
* Assistant Professor of Law, Director: Innocence Project Northwest Clinic-
University of Washington School of Law, J.D., University of Michigan Law School, B.G.S.,
University of Michigan. The author wishes to thank Professors Deborah Maranville, Helen
A. Anderson, Steve P. Calandrillo and Julia A. Gold for their comments, and Chester Gil-
more for his research assistance. The author also expresses her appreciation to the lawyers,
law students, and others who volunteered their time to the IPNW. In particular, the author
thanks Doris Green and her attorneys, Suzanne Elliott and James M. Roe, for allowing her
story to be told.
1. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEF., GIDEON'S BROKEN
PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUALJUSTIE-A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION'S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38
(2004) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] ("[I]ndigent defense ... remains in a state of crisis, re-
sulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk
of wrongful conviction.").
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Amendment ensured that attorneys comply with their ethical du-
ties to zealously advocate for clients and to refuse representation
that involves a conflict of interest. Instead, under our Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, courts have found the constitutional
guarantee to counsel satisfied even in cases where the defendant's
lawyer engaged in egregious instances of ethical misconduct.! The
rules of professional responsibility do impose a higher standard of
conduct than the Constitution. For example, no one would suggest
that attorneys who are asleep or drunk at trial are in compliance
with the rules of professional responsibility. And yet, courts have
found a defendant's constitutional right to counsel met when rep-
resented by a lawyer who was intoxicated or asleep during trial.3
This Article proposes turning towards a different jurisprudence,
founded in contract law, to challenge provisions in indigent de-
fense contracts that violate ethical canons, as a means of improving
the quality of indigent defense. The need for reform is poignantly
illustrated by recent events demonstrating that when the indigent
defense system fails, innocent people are convicted of crimes. 4 In
2. See, e.g., Mickens v. Greene, 74 F Supp. 2d 586, 612, 615 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd sub
nom. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (finding that a defense attorney who successively
represented defendant and victim in a capital trial had a "myopic view of the potential con-
flicts and utter insensitivity to the ethical issues raised by the facts" and had conducted
himself "unwisely, and in derogation of his ethical duties", but holding that the representa-
tion did not violate defendant's constitutional rights).
3. See, e.g., People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (finding no showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel when attorney was arrested driving to court with a .27 blood
alcohol content and declarations indicated that attorney "drank in the morning, during
court recesses, and throughout the evening"); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505-06
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that defendant was not denied effective assistance of coun-
sel by fact that his lead counsel slept through parts of trial).
4. Incompetent lawyering contributed to the conviction of Jimmy Ray Bromgard,
who, at age eighteen, was sentenced to forty years in prison for the rape of an eight-year-old
girl. Bromgard served fifteen years before being exonerated through post-conviction DNA
tests. At trial, he was represented by an attorney known as "Jailhouse John Adams" who "met
with him once before trial, hired no investigators or scientific experts, filed no motions to
suppress evidence, made no opening statement, failed to prepare Mr. Bromgard for his
testimony and, after indicating he would appeal, did not." Adam Liptak, DNA Will Let a Mon-
tana Man Put Prison Behind Him, but Questions Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A22. Dennis
Williams was sentenced to death in a case that became known as the "Ford Heights Four."
Williams was represented at trial by an attorney defending three co-defendants. His attorney
failed to investigate exculpatory evidence and failed to challenge flawed forensic evidence.
William's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was initially rejected by the state supreme
court. In subsequent disbarment proceedings against Williams' attorney, evidence surfaced
that the lawyer was suffering a personal collapse during Williams' trial. The state supreme
court then reversed Williams' conviction and ordered a new trial. It took many more years
before DNA tests exonerated Williams and his codefendants. During that time, the licenses
of three other defense lawyers for the Ford Heights Four were suspended or revoked. BARRY
SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 183-86 (2000) [hereinafter SCHECK ET
AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE].
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the past two decades over 300 exonerations have occurred in the
United States. 5 The advent of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
has irrefutably established that people are convicted and sen-
tenced, sometimes to death, for crimes they did not commit.
6
Studies of exonerations conclude that poor lawyering plays a sub-
stantial role in the conviction of the innocent.
7
In its successful effort to free innocent people convicted during
a sex-ring investigation, the Innocence Project Northwest (IPNW) s
reached the same conclusion regarding the impact of poor lawyer-
ing in wrongful convictions. For three years, the organization
devoted itself to overturning convictions of individuals wrongly
imprisoned for child sex-abuse in Wenatchee, Washington in the
mid-1990s. The IPNW investigations uncovered evidence of over-
zealous and abusive actions by police and social service
caseworkers, prosecutorial misconduct, unreliable forensic evi-
dence, conflicts of interest, and ineffective representation by
criminal defense attorneys."
The terms of an existing indigent defense contract divided
counsels' loyalties, and resulted in ineffective advocacy. The fixed-
fee contract contained a clause that required the contracting
attorney0 to identify conflicts of interest and employ substitute
counsel when a conflict of interest arose. The clause specified that
no additional funds would be provided to the contracting attorney
for payment of substitute counsel. These contract clauses led to
5. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005) (identifying 340 exonerations between 1989
and 2003, 144 of which were exonerations based on postconviction DNA testing, and 196
cases where individuals were freed through other types of evidence).
6. See, e.g., The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited
Aug. 25, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing a
current list of DNA exonerations); Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: List of Those
Freed From Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=l 10 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing a current list of death
penalty exonerees and noting the role of DNA evidence).
7. SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 263 (stating that ineffective or
incompetent defense counsel played a role in the conviction of thirty percent of the first
sixty-two DNA exonerations in the United States).
8. IPNW was founded at the University of Washington School of Law in 1997. It be-
gan as a volunteer organization of professors, lawyers, and law students dedicated to
providing legal representation to underprivileged individuals imprisoned for crimes they
did not commit. In 2002, IPNW became part of the Clinical Law Program at the University
of Washington School of Law. See University of Washington School of Law Clinical Law Pro-
gram, http://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/IPNW.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. For purposes of this Article, "contracting attorney" and "indigent defense contrac-
tor" refer to the lawyer or organization entering into a contract with a government entity for
the delivery of indigent defense services.
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tragic results in Washington when a morass of conflicts arose as
multiple indigent defendants were charged with thousands of
counts of child sex abuse involving the same victims. The indigent
defense contract created a situation of divided loyalties where
counsels' personal and financial interests took precedent over the
interests of their clients, in contravention of counsels' duties of
professional responsibility.
The conflict of interest provision in the indigent defense con-
tract violated the canons of ethics in several ways. First, it created a
financial disincentive to identify and declare conflicts of interest by
penalizing the contracting lawyer for withdrawing from a case.
Second, it mandated third party payment of conflict counsel with-
out requiring the client's informed consent, and allowed no
alternative method of obtaining independent defense counsel
should the client refuse to waive the conflict. Finally, it placed the
contracting attorney in the untenable position of hiring substitute
counsel to defend clients whose interests were adverse to those of
the contracting attorney's clients.
This Article proposes that fixed-fee indigent defense contracts
that contain clauses requiring the contracting attorney to pay for
conflict counsel out of a fixed-fee are subject to challenge under
the contract theory of unconscionability, or on the ground that the
contract violates public policy. Part I of the Article begins with a
review of the Wenatchee cases, which illustrate the need for indi-
gent defense reform. Part II provides an overview of indigent
defense in the United States, with a focus on the increase in the
use of low bid contracts and the conflict of interest scenarios that
arise when contracting for indigent defense. Part III discusses the
inherent and irreconcilable conflicts of interest that occur when an
indigent defense contractor is obligated to pay for conflict counsel
from the funds provided in a fixed-fee contract. Part IV explains
why a constitutional challenge to these types of contracts would be
unsuccessful. Part V discusses the intersection between contract law
and criminal law, and the application of contract theory to the in-
digent defense contracts in question. Part VI contends that bar
associations are the proper organizations to challenge these types
of indigent defense contracts because the contracts are injurious to
the organizations' missions. The Article concludes by suggesting
that challenges to indigent defense contracts under the principles
of contract law are a means of supplementing, not supplanting,
challenges brought under the Constitution.
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I. THE WENATCHEE CASES-A STUDY IN
THE NEED FOR REFORM
In 1994 and 1995, forty-three adults were arrested on 29,726
charges of child sex abuse involving over sixty children in the We-
natchee Valley of Eastern Washington.1" Wenatchee and East
Wenatchee are part of Chelan County, a beautiful area east of the
Cascade Mountains in the state of Washington, where many of the
62,000 residents are supported by the orchard farming economy. It
is the last place one would expect to find a "collection of incestu-
ous pedophiles lurk[ing] among the orchards and brown ridgetops
... sexually assaulting as many as 48 children."
12
A. The Investigation
The investigation began when two married couples pled guilty to
child rape and molestation of family members. However, after
prosecutors conducted multiple interviews of the children, addi-
tional charges were filed in what the prosecutors contended was a
"multifamily sex-ring in which parents, their children, and adult
friends participated in group sex.' i3 The media latched on to the
lurid details in the cases to report that the accusations were "mind
boggling."
4
As time went on, the allegations became increasingly bizarre,
evolving from disclosures of young children touching each other's
private parts into scenarios where parents swapped children with
other adults, and adults (including a Child Protective Services
worker) stood in line to have sex with children. 5 Early in the inves-
tigations the primary officer, Detective Perez, became the foster
parent of a girl who had made the initial disclosures of abuse.' 6 The
investigation widened in March of 1995, when Detective Perez put
his foster child in the front seat of his police car and drove her
11. See Andrew Schneider & Mike Barber, Children Sacrificed for the Case; Allegations Set
up a Puzzle of Doubtful Ethics, Dubious Facts, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 23, 1998, at
A6 [hereinafter Schneider & Barber, Children Sacrificed].
12. Scott Sunde, Wenatchee Sex-Abuse Probe Widens; Minister, Wife Join List of Those
Charged, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
13. Gordy Holt, Parent-Child Group Sex-ring is Uncovered; Probe of Wenatchee Incest Cases
Turns "Mind Boggling, "SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 8, 1994, at BI.
14. Id.
15. See KATHRYN LYON, WITCH HUNT: A TRUE STORY OF SOCIAL HYSTERIA AND
ABUSEDJUSTICE xxxii-xxxiii (1998).
16. See Schneider & Barber, Children Sacrificed, supra note 11, at A6.
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through Wenatchee and East Wenatchee. The foster child identi-
fied locations where she said she and other children were
repeatedly raped and molested over a seven-year period. During
the drive, she pointed out a total of twenty-two homes and build-
ings and named adults who had participated in the abuse. When a
deliveryman and a taxi driver were spotted, they were added to the
list of abusers. 7 The following day Detective Perez questioned his
foster child at home for six hours, eliciting details of the orgies in
homes she identified during the drive. Other children, after re-
peated questioning by Detective Perez, told tales of orgies that took
place at several homes and at the Pentecostal church, where chil-
dren were said to sometimes fall into trances.'8 Accusations of
molestation by unidentified men in black clothes and sunglasses
followed.' 9
The official response was not to test the veracity of these "mind-
boggling" disclosures, nor to question the impartiality of Detective
Perez. Instead, charges were brought against the people named by
the children and arrested by the Detective. One suspect, Harold
Everett, was charged with 6,422 counts of child sex abuse. 20 When
asked how he arrived at the numbers, Detective Perez responded:
"It's just simple math ... I ask these people, 'How many times ...
did you have sexual intercourse with this child?' I'm sitting there
literally with a calculator and a pad, writing down what (criminal)
charge it fits. You add them up, and that's what goes on the arrest
form.,
2 1
In the end, over forty-three people were charged with sexual
abuse and twenty-eight of those individuals were convicted. The
convicted were among society's most vulnerable; the majority of
the individuals were poor and many suffered from developmental
disabilities or mental illness. 3
17. See id.
18. See LYON, supra note 15, at xxxii-xxxiii.
19. See id. at xxxv.
20. See Schneider & Barber, Children Sacrificed, supra note 11, at A7.
21. Id.
22. See Mike Barber & Andrew Schneider, The Accused: Over Two Years, 43 People Were
Charged with 27,726 Counts of Child Sex Abuse. 17 Were Convicted and Remain in Prison. 4 Were
Acquitted, SEAT-rLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1998, at A6 [hereinafter Barber & Schnei-
der, The Accused].
23. See Timothy Egan, Charges of Child Abuse Split a Town, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,1995, at
[VOL. 39:4
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B. The Miscarriages ofJustice
In 1998, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer published a series of articles
exposing the flaws in the investigation.24 At the time of publication,
seventeen people convicted in the Wenatchee investigations re-
mained in prison, and thirteen of those individuals did not have
counsel.25 The series captured the attention of the newly formed
Innocence Project Northwest (IPNW), a volunteer organization
based at the University of Washington School of Law. IPNW took
on the task of coordinating the representation of the unrepre-
sented individuals and began to solicit lawyers and law students to
work on the cases. The first organizational meeting took place on
July 10, 1998, with a volunteer group of over fifty-five lawyers, law
students, and law professors in attendance.26 At the meeting, each
of the thirteen individuals was assigned a legal defense team of
lawyers and law students who took on the task of that person's rep-
resentation. 7
The IPNW lawyers and law students held monthly meetings to
discuss legal issues of common interest in the cases. Experts in the
fields of recovered memories, false confessions, child suggestibility,
forensic linguistics, and forensic science agreed to volunteer their
time and assist in the defense. 8 The legal teams reinvestigated the
cases and uncovered a chronology of events that exposed overzeal-
ous and abusive actions by police and social service caseworkers,
prosecutorial misconduct, unreliable forensic evidence, and inef-
fective representation by criminal defense attorneys.29
Investigation and research by the IPNW attorneys and law stu-
dents revealed substantial new information that was previously
unavailable to the defendants. The investigation revealed patterns
in several areas, including:
24. See Andrew Schneider & Mike Barber, The Power To Harm, SEATTLE PosT-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 23-28, 1998.
25. Jacqueline McMurtrie, Justice-a cautionary tale--the Wenatchee cases, 4 BUrrER-
WORTHS FAM. L.J. 15, 16 (2002).
26. Id.
27. Elizabeth Amon, Many Injustices Call for Many Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at
A15.
28. Dr. Joyce Adams, Dr. Phillip Esplin, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, Dr. Richard Leo, Dr.
Roger Shuy, and Dr. Gail Stygall were among those who volunteered their expertise in the
cases.
29. See McMurtrie, supra note 25, at 16-18.
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Threatening and suggestive interviewing of alleged vic-
tims. 3° Children were questioned repeatedly-some
more than a dozen times ("It is clear from police
reports that children were subjected to as many as
13 investigative interviews"); 3' children were called
liars when they denied abuse or said they didn't
know anything ("[An interviewer stated:] 'It's well
known that children are telling the truth when they
say they've been abused.... But [they] are usually
lying when they deny it."); 32 interviewers used a
threatening tone during the interviews and asked
leading and suggestive questions;
34
Separating children from supportive counselors. Investi-
gators instructed Child Protective Services to take
immediate action to remove the children from any
counselors who entertained a belief that molesta-
tion had not occurred because they would not be
good witnesses;
35
30. See, e.g., Andrew Schneider & Mike Barber, Children Hurt By The System, Society's Pro-
tectors Bent, Broke and Ignored Rules, SEAT7IE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24, 1998, at Al, A6
("Numerous children say they were hurt horribly--not by rapists but by state Department of
Social and Health Services caseworkers and counselors and therapists hired by DSHS or its
Office of Child Protective Services.... A former associate dean at Spokane's Gonzaga Uni-
versity, UJuana Vasquez] returned to her hometown in 1988 to work as a DSHS supervisor.
Her career in state government was short. She says she and two other Wenatchee staff mem-
bers were fired after complaining about 'blatantly inappropriate' actions of DSHS
caseworkers, therapists and Perez. 'Counseling sessions became interrogations, placements
(in foster homes) were used as threats. Warnings that they'd never see their parents again
were held over the children's heads if they failed to say they had been abused,' Vasquez
says.").
31. VICKI WALLEN ET AL., STATE OF WASH. OFFICE OF THE FAMILY & CHILDREN'S OM-
BUDSMAN, 1998 REVIEW OF THE WENATCHEE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS 26-27
(1998) ("At one point, a prosecutor requested that the court dismiss criminal charges
against the defendant. One reason for the prosecutor's request was that one of the child
witnesses had 'suffered emotional distress due to the strain of the numerous interviews' and
was no longer available as a witness.").
32. Schneider & Barber, Children Sacrificed, supra note 11, at A8. See also State v. Everett,
No. 94-1-00454-0 & No. 94-1-00455-8, slip op. at 15 (Chelan Co. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998) (Court's
Memorandum Decision on Reference Hearing) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Court's Memorandum Decision on Reference Hear-
ing] (noting that teenager who denied that he was sexually abused was confronted by
detective with, "You're lying, and I know it") ; WALLEN, supra note 31, at 26-27 (1998) (ref-
erencing numerous instances of children being called liars when they denied being abused).
33. WALLEN, supra note 31, at 26-27 (referencing numerous instances of coercive
questioning on the part of the authorities).
34. Id. at 24-25.
35. See Court's Memorandum Decision on Reference Hearing, supra note 32, at 35
("Detective Perez told CPS to take immediate action to remove the children from any coun-
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Removing children who denied abuse from their homes.
Investigators removed alleged victims from their
homes and placed those children with foster par-
ents or in an out-of-state psychiatric hospital (After
denying that her parents abused her, a sixteen-year
girl was strapped to a gurney even though she had
never been violent, and taken to Pinecrest. At Pine-
crest, she was repeatedly pressed to reveal abuse
and was told that she had a memory block and
should have hypnotherapy.) ;36
Cross-contamination of accusations. Investigators told
one child what another child, a sibling, or a parent
had allegedly said and routinely brought in siblings
or other family members so that one child heard
the allegation of others;
37
* Coercive and manipulative interrogations. Mentally re-
tarded and/or otherwise vulnerable adults were
threatened with life imprisonment and termination
of parental rights during the interrogations;
s
* Undisclosed conflicts of interest. Judges, prosecutors,
Child Protective Services employees, and defense
attorneys were laboring under conflicts of interest
which were not revealed to the defendants;
39
selors who entertained a belief that molestation had not occurred because they would not be good
witnesses.").
36. Id. at 39-41.
37. WALLEN, supra note 31, at 31 ("[Police and CPS workers] actively participated in
giving witnesses information about what other witnesses were saying.... [C]hildren's thera-
pists routinely brought in siblings or other family members so that one child heard the
allegations of others.").
38. Everett v. Abbey, 31 P.3d 721, 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he evidence of De-
tective Perez's tactics is sufficient on its face to support a finding of impropriety. .. . The
record supports the reference hearing court's finding the interview tactics used in this case
were improper." (internal citation omitted)).
39. See, e.g., McMurtrie, supra note 25, at 15 ("At a pretrial hearing, [the defendant]
Doris Green found herself in [c]ourt with her lawyer, the prosecutor and the judge. On the
witness stand was Detective Perez, the main witness against Ms[.] Green. The stated agenda
for the hearing was to determine whether or not ... [Doris Green's] confession would be
admitted as evidence. In order to make that ruling, the Judge would need to determine
whether Detective Perez's version of the interrogation was more credible than the account
of Doris Green. However, the hearing also contained a hidden agenda. Unbeknownst to
Doris Green: the Judge's wife served as the guardian ad litem for her children, her defense
lawyer had represented Detective Perez in his second divorce action, the Judge had actual
notice of the defense attorney's conflict because he signed the decree of dissolution, and the
Judge had represented Detective Perez in his first divorce action. The confession was admit-
ted as evidence, and Doris Green was convicted at trial and sentenced to 280 months (23.3
years) in prison.").
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Ineffective assistance of counsel4  Defense lawyers
urged their clients to plead guilty without conduct-
ing any investigation into the charges;4 many lacked
experience handling complex cases; 42 and others
were denied adequate resources to defend their cli-
43
ents.
In the Wenatchee cases, the lack of advocacy by defense counsel
played a substantial role in contributing to the wrongful convic-
tions of indigent defendants. And in many cases, attorneys were
burdened by conflicts of interest that affected the representation
of their clients. At the time of the sex-ring investigations, one law
firm received a lump sum of money to provide legal representation
for indigent defendants in all of the criminal matters in Chelan
County, where Wenatchee is located. In addition, the law firm
providing indigent defense for the county was responsible under
the contract for identifying conflict of interest cases and employing
outside counsel to represent defendants in those cases.4 5The con-
tract provided that there would be "no further payment for such
40. Mike Barber, Prosecutor Now Wants Freedom for Defendant, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (noting that prosecutor agreed with defense counsel's
claim that the latter's client received inadequate representation of counsel and did not chal-
lenge his appeal).
41. Mike Barber & Andrew Schneider, With Every Step, Rights were Trampled, SEATT-LE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Barber & Schneider, With Every Step]
(relaying conversation with Chief Public Defender Jeff Barker: "'Did everyone have a mini-
mally qualified defense? I believe they did. Did they have a great defense?' He answers his
own question with a shrug."); Andrew Schneider & Mike Barber, "Lies, Lies And More Lies,"
Says Jailed Man, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1998, at A6 (reporting that Manuel
Hidalgo Rodriguez, a defendant in the cases, stated: "My lawyer only talked to me 20 min-
utes. He was telling me 'Plead guilty, guilty, guilty."'). See also Personal Restraint Petition at
26-31, 33-43, In re Henry Cunningham, No. 180093 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1998) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting that defense attorney failed
to interview defendant's psychiatrist, who had information casting doubt on the veracity of
the confession and upon defendant's physical inability to commit abuse. The attorney also
failed to interview witnesses at defendant's place of employment who would have testified
that it was unlikely that the defendant abused his daughters at work, as was alleged. Instead
defense counsel visited defendant on the eve of trial, urging him to plead guilty to the
charges, without having negotiated a sentencing recommendation from the state.).
42. Barber & Schneider, With Every Step, supra note 41, at Al (Defendant was repre-
sented by an attorney who advised her to plead no contest and accept a fifty-six month
sentence. At the time, the attorney had practiced law for a little over a year. And, the attor-
ney failed to introduce a report from a forensic psychologist, which concluded that the
defendant was not competent to stand trial.).
43. Id. (relating that the defense attorney quit the law after he was denied adequate
resources to defend two clients he believed were innocent).
44. Contract for Legal Services for Indigent Criminal Defendants in Chelan County, at
1 (Dec. 21, 1993) (contract between Chelan County and Barker & Howard, P.S.) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Barker & Howard
Contract].
45. Id. at 3.
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outside counsel." 6 As further illustrated by the case of Doris Green
(infra Section III.B), the indigent defense contract, and notably the
conflict of interest provision, created insurmountable problems
and guaranteed that indigent defendants would receive inadequate
counsel, who labored under divided loyalties.
II. INDIGENT DEFENSE
The majority of people who are charged with crimes in the
United States cannot afford to hire their own attorneys. 7 More
than forty years ago the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright,5 announced a constitutional right to counsel
at public expense for those who could not afford counsel . In do-
ing so, the Court resoundingly embraced the principle that
defense lawyers for the poor were necessary to protect the ac-
cused's fundamental right to a fair trial.50
Although the government's obligation to provide counsel to in-
digent defendants is clear, the Gideon Court did not specify how
governments should comply with the constitutional mandate.
Thus, the quality of indigent defense services and the method by
which it is provided varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Studies
have shown that with the proper support, including adequate fund-
ing, training, and experience, attorneys providing indigent defense
achieve as great a success on behalf of their clients as private coun-
sel in acquittals, charge reductions, and short sentences.5' Due to
46. Id.
47. CAROLINE WOLF HAPLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES 1 (2000) (noting that in 1998, approximately 66% of federal felony defendants and
82% percent of felony defendants in the seventy-five largest state counties were represented
by public defenders or assigned counsel). In Washington State, approximately 85% to 90%
of all trial level criminal defendants in superior court are indigent. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE, CRITERIA AND STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING AND VERIFYING INDIGENCY
12 (2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
www.opd.wa.gov/report%202.htm (follow hyperlink "Criteria and Standards for Determin-
ing and Verifying Indigency" under "Other Reports").
48. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965).
49. Id. at 344. Gideon was charged with a felony, but the right to counsel for all crimes
that involve potential imprisonment was affirmed in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). More recently, the Court held that a suspended sentence that may end up in actual
deprivation of personal liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded
counsel in the prosecution for the crime charged. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658
(2002).
50. Gidean, 372 U.S. at 344.
51. See, e.g., ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT DE-
FENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 3 (1992) (concluding after study of nine state
trial court indigent defense systems, that indigent defenders are "as successful as privately
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the lack of adequate funding for indigent defense, however, it is
well documented that there is a severe shortage of indigent de-
fenders who provide quality representation. Moreover, studies
concluding that indigent defenders get the same results for their
clients as retained counsel have primarily been conducted in large
urban areas." Fewer studies have been conducted in municipalities
and rural counties, meaning that the quality of indigent represen-
tation in non-urban settings has received less scrutiny." The
deficiencies in indigent defense services in smaller counties have
retained counsel in gaining favorable outcomes for their clients (e.g. acquittals, charge re-
ductions, and short sentences to prison)" and attributing the success in part to the presence
of experienced counsel); HARLOW, supra note 47, at 1 (reporting that conviction rates in
both federal and large state courts were the same for defendants represented by indigent
defenders and private lawyers, but that higher percentages of defendants with indigent de-
fenders were sentenced to incarceration); Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public
Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 361, 366 (1991) (reviewing numerous studies from the 1970s and early 1980s,
which collectively suggest that defendants with retained and appointed counsel receive simi-
lar outcomes in the adjudication of their cases). Cf WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 35 (1997) (explaining that
"though early studies showed that defendants with retained and appointed counsel had
similar outcomes, some more recent studies suggest that defendants with retained counsel
do significantly better" (citations omitted)).
52. HANSON ET AL., supra note 50. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 38
("[I]ndigent defense ... remains in a state of crisis, resulting in a system that lacks funda-
mental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of wrongful conviction." (emphasis
omitted)); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for
Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 846 (2004) (containing reference by author, a lifetime
advocate of improved indigent defense services and a prolific scholar, to "numerous law
review articles in which the deplorable state of indigent defense has been exposed, empha-
sizing the connection between lack of adequate funding and the quality of representation").
53. See, e.g., HANSON ET AL., supra note 51, at 29 (noting that only three out of the nine
communities studied had populations under 50,000); HARLOW, supra note 47, at 1 (contain-
ing a study conducted in federal courts and state courts of the seventy-five largest counties in
the United States).
54. The Spangenberg Group, a preeminent research and consulting firm on indigent
defense issues, has done studies of over a dozen county indigent defense systems, all located
in counties with large populations. See The Spangenberg Group, Indigent Defense Studies,
http://www.spangenberggroup.com/work_indig.html (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform). The smallest counties included in the list of studies are the
County of Lancaster, Nebraska, with a population of around 260,000 in 2005, and Cameron
County, Texas, with a 2005 population of around 378,000. Other regional and county studies
ranged from Albuquerque, New Mexico (around 484,000) to Los Angeles County (around
9,000,000 in 2005). Id. For population estimates, see www.census.gov.
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come out anecdotally through news articles55 and reports issued by
56 5
commissions and committees. 7
The lack of national uniformity in the provision of indigent de-
fense services, coupled with a lack of oversight of the diverse
methods of funding indigent defense, makes Gideon's guarantee of
a fair trial a hollow promise. Some jurisdictions have undertaken a
market-driven approach to indigent defense services, without re-
gard to the ethical obligations placed upon attorneys by the rules
of professional responsibility. The following section provides an
overview of the different models of indigent defense used
throughout the country, a discussion of the increase in competi-
tive, or low-bid, contracting for indigent defense contracts, and the
ethical dilemmas that are implicated when contracting for indigent
defense.
A. Indigent Defense Models
After Gideon was decided, state and local governments began the
effort of developing new systems or expanding existing systems in
order to comply with the Court's mandate. 8 Currently, three dif-
ferent models are used to provide indigent defense services:
(1) public defender, (2) assigned counsel, and (3) contract attor-
neys. The public defender model involves a public or private non-
profit organization whose office is staffed with attorneys working
exclusively as public defenders. In ajurisdiction using the assigned
counsel model, private attorneys are assigned indigent criminal
cases-generally by a judge-and the lawyers are paid on a case-by-
case basis. The contract model employs a contract between ajuris-
diction and an individual attorney or an organization to provide
indigent defense for the jurisdiction.59 The types of contracts under
55. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong, Florangela Davila & Justin Mayo, The Empty Promise of
Equal Defense, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 4-6, 2004, at Al (reporting on the inadequate state of
indigent defense in Grant County, Washington, whose population was approximately 81,000
in 2005). For population estimates, see www.census.gov.
56. See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE WSBA BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON
CRIMINAL DEFENSE App. 5 (2004), http://www.wsba.org/blueribbonreport.pdf (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
57. See e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 5.
58. See 1 LEE SILVERMAN, Am. BAR FOUND., DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES
IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 253-67 (1965) (giving an index of
criminal counsel schemes in 1965).
59. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Toward a More Effective Right to Assis-
tance of Counsel, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, LAw & COMTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1995, at 31-32.
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a contract system can range from a "fixed-fee, all cases" contract,
where the contract price covers all cases in the jurisdiction, regard-
less of the number of cases or the level of complexity of the cases,
to a "hourly fee, without caps" contract, where attorneys are paid
the hourly fee specified in the contract without placing a cap on
the total amount of compensation an attorney can receive for each
60
case.
B. Low-bid Contracting for Indigent Defense
The use of the contract system to provide indigent defense ser-
vices has grown significantly in the past two decades.61 The
movement towards the contract model is driven in part by an in-
crease in the number of indigent defendants and the use of
contract counsel to handle conflict and overload cases in jurisdic-
tions with a public defender office. However, the increase in the
use of the contract system is primarily based upon an attempt by
funding authorities to reduce costs in the face of increased prose-
62
cutions.
The question of whether quality representation can be provided
under a contract model is the subject of academic and professional
debate." The American Bar Association (ABA) and the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) have conducted
extensive studies and evaluations of indigent defense systems and
promulgated standards and guidelines to assist with the provision
60. Other types of contracts include the "Fixed-Fee, Specified Type of Case Is]" (a flat
fee contract for a specific category of cases, e.g., all misdemeanors); "Flat Fee, Specific
Number of Cases" (a flat fee for a specific number of cases undertaken by the attorney dur-
ing the contract period); "Flat Fee Per Case" (sets a fee by case type, e.g., $150 per
misdemeanor); and "Hourly Fee With Caps" (a set hourly fee with a cap on the total amount
of compensation the attorney can receive). THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, U.S. DEP'T. OFJUS-
TICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2000)
[hereinafter USDOJ REPORT].
61. See, e.g., USDOJ REPORT, id. at 3; ACLU OF WASH., THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
GIDEON: WASHINGTON'S FLAWED SYSTEM OF DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 17 (2004) (noting that
twenty-four of Washington State's thirty-nine counties rely on private contractors to provide
indigent defense services).
62. See USDOJ REPORT, supra note 60, at 3.
63. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indi-
gent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv 1808, 1842 (2000) (advocating for litigation through § 1983
civil actions to challenge indigent defense contracts); Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note
59, at 35 (concluding that many jurisdictions have adopted fixed-price contracts solely as a
means of trimming costs at the expense of quality representation); Low-Bid Criminal Defense
Contracting: Justice in Retreat, CHAMPION, Nov. 1997, at 22 [hereinafter Low-Bid Criminal De-
fense Contracting] (documenting the failure of low-bid contracts in providing quality
representation).
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of indigent defense services. Both organizations endorse the use
of the public defense system.65 In order for a contract system to
provide quality representation, the contract must include safe-
guards such as minimum attorney qualifications; work-load and
case-load standards; limits on a lawyer's ability to practice law out-
side the contract; funding for support staff, paralegals,
investigators, and social workers; and a method for overseeing and
evaluating the provision of services under the contract.66 Unfortu-
nately, the trend has been to award contracts on the basis of cost
alone, leading to an erosion of the constitutional principle of the
right to counsel and the diminishing of lawyers' professional re-
67
sponsibilities.
C. Conflict of Interest Scenarios
When contracting for the provision of indigent defense services,
the parties need to take into consideration the lawyer's ethical ob-
ligation not to undertake representation that involves a conflict of
interest.6" The conflict of interest problems that arise from indigent
64. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
Standard 5-1.2 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ABA DEFENSE SERVICES STANDARDS]; NAT'L LE-
GAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, NLADA MODEL CONTRACT FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES
(2000), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1025702469.09/Full%20volume.doc/ (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter NLADA MODEL
CONTRACT]; NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, NLADA GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING
AND AWARDING INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE CONTRACTS (1984), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/998926360.668/black%201etter.doc (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter NLADA GUIDELINES]. See also USDOJ REPORT, supra
note 60, at 4 (identifying the specific features of deficient versus effective contract systems
and making recommendations for jurisdictions to ensure that quality is not sacrificed in the
name of cost).
65. ABA DEFENSE SERVICES STANDARDS, supra note 64, Standard 5-1.2 (recommending
that each jurisdiction should provide for the services of a full-time defender organization
and active and substantial participation of the private bar); id. at 8 (citing NAT'L LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, 1.2.a (1976) ("[a] full-time de-
fender organization should be available for all communities, rural or metropolitan, as the
preferred method of supplying legal services.")); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE ch. 13.5 (1973),
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/Standards_ForThe_
Defense (recommending that each jurisdiction have a full-time public defender program
and an assigned counsel program with substantial participation of the private bar).
66. USDOJ REPORT, supra note 60, at 16.
67. Lemos, supra note 63, at 1810 n.16 (reporting that the "use of low-bid contracts to
provide indigent defense services has been criticized roundly by bar association, government
and academic studies").
68. Every state bar has an ethical rule prohibiting lawyers from undertaking represen-
tation that involves a conflict of interest. See 2 NATIONAL REPORTER OF LEGAL ETHICS AND
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defense contracts most often implicate an attorney's duty of loyalty
to the client.69 This loyalty can come into question when a lawyer's
loyalty is divided between a current and a former client ("loyalty to
others"), or when a lawyer puts his or her own financial or per-
sonal interests above that of the client ("loyalty to self') .
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representa-
tion-except under limited circumstances-for situations that
involve a "concurrent" conflict of interest.7  A concurrent conflict is
defined as representation that is "directly adverse" to another cli-
ent, or poses a "significant risk" that the representation will limit
the lawyer's responsibility to "another client, a former client or a
third person, or ... a personal interest of the lawyer."72 A lawyer
cannot undertake representation that involves a concurrent con-
flict of interest if the representation is prohibited by law (e.g.,
some states have laws prohibiting lawyers from representing co-
defendants in a capital case),73 or if the representation involves an
assertion of one client against another client in the same proceed-
ing.4 In other instances of concurrent conflicts, the lawyer can only
proceed with the representation if the lawyer reasonably believes
that he or she can offer competent and diligent representation,
and each affected client gives informed consent.75 Consent is "in-
formed" only if the lawyer communicates to the client enough
information for the client to understand the material risks of, and
the reasonably available alternatives to, the lawyer's representa-
76tion.
1. Loyalty to Others-Joint and Successive Representation-The con-
current representation of multiple defendants, or 'joint
representation" in criminal cases, is "strongly discouraged by ethics
rules and case law., 77 Under the Model Rules, joint representation
can only proceed if each affected client gives informed consent,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2001) (reprinting the codes of professional responsibility
for all fifty states).
69. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARDJR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 10-1,
at 10-3 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) ("Loyalty to clients is one of the core values of the legal profes-
sion, perhaps equal in importance with maintaining confidentiality and diligently or
zealously working to advance a client's interests.")
70. Conflicts of interest can arise when members of the contracting authority and
agency and/or the agency directors, officers and employees have a personal financial inter-
ests in the contract or agency. See NLADA MODEL CONTRACT, supra note 64, at 19.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
72. Id. at R. 1.7(b).
73. Id. atR. 1.7(b)(2) cmt. 16.
74. Id. at R. 1.7(b) (3).
75. Id. at R. 1.7(b) (2) (1), (4).
76. Id. at R. 1.0(e).
77. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 23.
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confirmed in writing. , The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
prohibit representing co-defendants, except in unusual situations
where counsel has determined, after careful investigation, that
there is "no conflict."79 Additionally, the ABA Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice mandate that a waiver of joint representation conflicts
be subject to judicial inquiry. Conflicts arising in the case of joint
representation are non-waivable, if the representation of co-
defendants jeopardizes the defense of one, by favoring one client
over the other.8 The problems are such that many commentators
urge a complete ban on joint representation of co-defendants in
12criminal cases.
Once a lawyer's representation of a client ends, the conflict of
interest rules involved with "successive representation" recognize
that the lawyer's obligation to the client diminishes, and the rules
become more permissive. Under Model Rule 1.9(a), the lawyer
must obtain the former client's written informed consent before
representing a new client in "the same or a substantially related"
matter in which that person's interests are "materially adverse" to
the interests of the former client.
83
Drafting an indigent defense contract that accounts for the ethi-
cal questions raised by joint and successive representation is
problematic. Whether in small municipalities or large, urban areas,
contractors may find themselves in a position of representing co-
defendants, or clients charged as co-defendants of former clients.
Defense attorneys may also find themselves representing criminal
defendants in cases where the government's witnesses are former
clients. The NLADA Model Contract contains a clause requiring
the agency to agree to screen cases for conflicts brought about by
co-defendants and adverse witnesses upon assignment and
throughout the discovery process, and to refer to the state rules of
professional conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
78. Id. at R. 1.7(b).
79. ABA DEFENSE SERVICES STANDARDS, supra note 64, § 4-3.5(c).
80. Id. See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 478-80 (1978) (prejudice was pre-
sumed when trial court denied defense counsel's motion of separate counsel in case where
counsel asserted he could not adequately represent the divergent interests of three co-
defendants).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b) (3) (2002).
82. See, e.g., Debra L. Basset, Three's a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 387 (2001); John S. Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants, 62
MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978); Gary L. Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Appraisa4 64 VA. L. REV. 939 (1978); Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of
Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1979).
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2002).
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for guidance in determining the existence of conflicts and in re-
solving the conflicts.
84
2. Loyalty to Self-Personal/Financial Conflicts of Interest-A "con-
current" conflict of interest can also arise when the contracting
attorney's personal interest conflicts with the provision of legal ser-
vices.85 This "personal" conflict of interest is at the heart of many
challenges to royalty agreements, where lawyers sign book deals in
816high profile cases, and contingency fee arrangements in criminal
defense cases.87 It has also been used as a basis to challenge indi-
gent defense contracts."' In an attempt to prevent financial
conflicts of interest, the NLADA Guidelines specifically warn
against the practice of holding the contracting attorney responsi-
ble for the expenses of investigations, expert witnesses, transcripts,
and other necessary defense costs. 89 Attorneys burdened with these
financial responsibilities may be tempted to waive a client's right to
trial to limit their out-of-pocket costs, rather than making the deci-
sion solely on the basis of the client's best interest.
84. NLADA MODEL CONTRACT, supra note 64, at 6 ("Conflicts of interest may arise in
numerous situations in the representation of indigent defendants. The Agency agrees to
screen all cases for conflict upon assignment and throughout the discovery process, and to
notify promptly the Contracting Authority when a conflict is discovered. The Agency will
refer to the [state] Rules of Professional Conduct, as interpreted by [the state or other rele-
vant Bar Association and/or] opinions of the state judiciary, and to the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice in order to determine the existence and appro-
priate resolution of conflicts.").
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
86. Compare People v. Corona, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915-16 (Ct. App. 1978) (reversing a
conviction in a case where the court found that a literary and dramatic rights agreement
created a situation where counsel was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and his
client's interests), with Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745, 881 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 829 (1995) (holding that defendant in capital case failed to establish that media rights
agreement between the defendant and his attorney created a conflict of interest).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2) prohibits a lawyer from entering
into an arrangement for, charging for, or collecting a contingent fee for representing a de-
fendant in a criminal case. However, courts have found that a contingency fee arrangement
is not a per se ground for reversal of the defendant's conviction. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2002). See, e.g., Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1022 (1994) (finding that the contingency fee created an actual conflict
of interest for trial counsel because Winkler's interests in effective representation were pit-
ted against trial counsel's monetary interest, but that the defendant did not show counsel's
representation was adversely affected by the conflict of interest). For a critique of the per se
prohibition against contingent fees in criminal cases see Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees
and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 595 (1993).
88. See People v. Barboza, 627 P.2d 188, 189-91 (Cal. 1981) (invalidating a public de-
fense contract that created a financial disincentive for the public defender to investigate and
declare conflicts of interest); People v. Knight, 194 Cal. App.3d 337, 346-48 (Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that there was an insufficient factual basis to hold that indigent defense contract,
which provided a flat fee regardless of whether a case went to trial and allowed attorneys to
engage in private practice, created a financial disincentive for attorneys to go to trial).
89. See NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at Guideline 111-13.
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Financial conflicts of interest can also arise when an indigent de-
fense attorney is financially penalized for withdrawing from a case
because of a conflict of interest. Most germane to this Article, the
ABA Standards call for a provision of funds independent of the
funds provided in the indigent defense contract to compensate
conflict counsel.0 The NLADA Guidelines warn against financially
penalizing the indigent defense contractor or individual attorneys
for withdrawing from a case that poses a conflict of interest to the
attorney.91
III. PAYING FOR CONFLICT CASES FROM A FIXED-FEE
INDIGENT DEFENSE CONTRACT-THE CREATION
OF AN UNWAIVABLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Chelan County contract illustrates the personal and financial
conflicts of interest that arise when a contracting attorney agrees to
pay for conflict counsel as part of the attorney's contractual obliga-
tion. Unlike the nineteen states which employ a state-wide public
defender system,92 each of Washington's thirty-nine counties and its
numerous municipalities determine how to provide indigent de-
fense services. The result is a "patchwork" of varying practices
across the state.93 Chelan County, which is the seventeenth most
populous county in the state,94 changed its method of providing
representation in 1975 from an assigned counsel to a contract sys-
tem.9'5 In maintaining a contract system, it ignored the
recommendations of the county bar association that the County
90. ABA DEFENSE SERVICES STANDARDS, supra note 64, at Standard 5-3.3(b), (vii)
("Contracts for services should include ... a policy for conflict of interest cases and the
provision of funds outside of the contract to compensate conflict counsel for fees and ex-
penses.").
91. SeeNLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at Guideline 111-13.
92. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES 1-2 (1999) (reporting that in twenty-one states, virtually all of the funding for
indigent defense comes from the state, and that nineteen of those states use the public de-
fender system). Since the report was written, at least two more states--Georgia and
Montana-have enacted state-wide public defender programs. See Mike Dennison, Public
Defender System Cited as National Mode GREAT FALLS TRIB., June 8, 2005, at IA; Bill Rankin,
Legislature 2004: Indigent Defense Bill Ok'd House-Passed Measure Puts Funding Mechanism In
Place, ATLAN-FAJ. & CONST., Mar. 16, 2004, at D4.
93. WASH. STATE BAR ASs'N, REPORT OF THE WSBA BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 4 (2004) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available
at http://www.wsba.org/blueribbonreport.pdf.
94. See PAUL A. BASTINE ET AL., WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENSE
SERVICES IN WASHINGTON 28 (1976).
95. Id. at 29.
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would be better served by adopting a public defender system. 96 At
the time of the Wenatchee sex-ring investigations, the County was
employing a "fixed-fee, all cases" contract that required the con-
tracting attorney to pay conflict counsel from the lump sum of
money received under the contract. The division of loyalties cre-
ated by this financial arrangement, combined with third-party
payment of conflict counsel, resulted in an indigent defense con-
tract with inherent, and irreconcilable conflicts of interest.
A. The Problem's Genesis-The Conflict of Interest
Clause in a Fixed-Fee Contract
In 1991, Chelan County entered into a two-year contract with
the Central Legal Defenders to provide legal representation to in-
digent defendants in all criminal matters, juvenile matters, mental
illness matters, and any other matters for which the court made an
appointment of attorney.97 The parties agreed that the Central Le-
gal Defenders were responsible for employing substitute counsel
should a conflict of interest arise.98 The contract price was
$500,000.99
After two years, Chelan County lowered its costs of indigent de-
fense by awarding the contract to the law firm of Barker and
Howard, P.S. at a contract price of $475,000.'0° The law firm agreed
to provide legal representation in all matters for which court-
appointed counsel was afforded on the basis of indigence.'0 ' This
contract's conflict of interest clause was even more specific in its
mandate that the law firm was responsible for hiring outside coun-
sel in cases of conflict of interest:
ATTORNEYS agree to employ such outside counsel and/or
firms as is necessary within the aforementioned payments to
represent persons appointed to ATTORNEYS with which
96. Id. (reporting that the Chelan County Commissioners did not concur with the
Chelan County Bar Association's recommendation that a public defender system would
provide the best representation for the county).
97. See Contract for Legal Services for Indigent Criminal Defendants in Chelan County
(Dec. 20, 1991) (contract between Chelan County and Central Washington Legal Defend-
ers) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 6.
100. See Barker & Howard Contract, supra note 44, at 1 (noting, for a four-year contract,
a contract price of $475,000 for 1994, $495,000 for 1995, $520,000 for 1996, and $545,000
for 1997).
101. Id.
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there may be a conflict of interest based upon ATTORNEYS
representation of a co-defendant or witness. There shall be no
further payment for such outside counsel.
Implicit in the contract was the understanding that the law firm
was to self-regulate its conflicts of interest without oversight.
As discussed in the following section, this type of contract cre-
ates an impermissible division of loyalties between contracting
lawyers, conflict counsel, and their clients. Additionally, the Chelan
County contract did not contain any of the features that have been
identified as ways to monitor and evaluate costs, while still provid-
ing quality representation.0 3 Furthermore, the contract was in
violation of a law enacted by the Washington state legislature in
1989, because the contract did not contain any standards regard-
ing compensation and caseload limits, limitations on private
practice, or a means of monitoring and evaluating attorneys. 0 4 The
contract was a "fixed-fee, all cases" contract, meaning that the con-
tract price covered all cases that arose in the jurisdiction regardless
of the number cases involved, or the level of complexity of the
105
cases.
The strain that tens of thousands of complex child-abuse
charges placed upon the Chelan County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office was acknowledged when the office was awarded an addi-
tional $141,000 to defray the costs of prosecution. 6 However, the
law firm that held the indigent defense contract did not receive
any additional funding for defending the cases, even though the
majority of the accused were indigent. 7 Since the indigent defense
contract did not allow for additional funds for this increase in de-
fendants, the law firm found itself in the position of choosing
which clients to represent, and hiring substitute counsel to repre-
sent defendants whose interests were adverse to its clients'
interests.
102. Id. at 3.
103. USDOJ REPORT, supra note 60, at 16. See supra Part I.B.
104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (1989). The Chelan County Contract could be
challenged on public policy grounds because it violated the legislative mandate of
§ 10.101.030. However, such a challenge is beyond the scope of this Article.
105. See supra note 61, for a discussion of other types of contracts.
106. Barber & Schneider, With Every Step, supra note 41, at A7.
107. Schneider & Barber, Children Sacrificed, supra note 11, at A7.
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B. The Problem Illustrated-The Case of Doris Green
When she was arrested in 1994, Doris Green was a 34-year-old
mother of four children, who worked in the fruit orchards of the
Wenatchee Valley."" She became part of the sex-ring investigations
when she was accused of horrific acts of sexual abuse and rape
against three children she babysat.0 9 The ordeal began when De-
tective Perez called Doris Green to the police station for an
interview and told her she was being interviewed in relation to
other sex abuse cases."0 However, the interview soon turned con-
frontational. According to Ms. Green, Detective Perez became
verbally and physically abusive and threatened to take away her
children if she did not confess to the crimes.1" After almost four
hours of interrogation, a four page typewritten statement was pro-
duced and was placed in front of Doris Green for her signature.
1 1 2
Ms. Green, who is marginally literate, asked Detective Perez to read
the statement to her and he refused to read her the entire state-
ment."i3 Doris Green signed the statement, in which she admitted
to vile acts of sexual abuse, and was booked into jail."4
Immediately after her arrest, Doris Green began writing to her
lawyer, vigorously asserting that Detective Perez fabricated her al-
leged confession. 115 Five days after her arrest, she was charged with
three counts of rape of a child in the first degree, and one count of
child molestation in the first degree. Jeffrey Barker, a partner in
the law firm that held the indigent defense contract, appeared as
counsel for Doris Green on September 23, 1994. On October 19,
1994, the law firm withdrew because of a conflict of interest and
David M. Bohr substituted as counsel." 6 In accordance with the
provisions of the indigent defense contract, David Bohr was paid by
the law firm holding the indigent defense contract.
On February 3, 1995, Bohr sent the following letter to Jeffrey
Barker:
108. Barber & Schneider, The Accused, supra note 22, at A6.
109. Personal Restraint Petition at 1-2, 6-7, In re the Personal Restraint of Doris Green,
No. 179206 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1998) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform).
110. Id. at 4-5.
111. Id. at 21-23.
112. Id. at 7-8, 22-24.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Personal Restraint Petition, In 7e the Personal Restraint of Doris Green at 20-25.
115. Id. at 34.
116. Id. at 30, app. 11 (noting that the law firm of Barker and Howard represented the
parents of PH., who had accused both her parents and Doris Green of sexual abuse).
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DearJeff:
In an attempt to save you money, I did, per your authorization
or that of Keith Howard, have Nick Yedinak review the file
and talk to Doris Green begging her again to plead to the
charges. Naturally, she refused and Yedinak sent me a bill for
$189.00. I would ask that you pay Nick direct.
Sincerely,
David M. Bohr"7
The letter illustrates the multi-faceted divisions of loyalty that
were engendered by the contract. Doris Green's attorney is writing
to his employer, Jeffrey Barker, who has withdrawn as Ms. Green's
counsel because he represents a client whose interests are adverse
to Ms. Green. And yet, Jeffrey Barker is making decisions about
Doris Green's representation by "authorizing" the hiring of a third
lawyer, whose mission is defined as "begging" Doris Green to plead
guilty. According to the letter, Doris Green's attorney's loyalties lie
not with his client, but with his employer. His declared interest is to
spare his employer the costs of a trial. And he is revealing client
confidences (a refusal to plead guilty) to a lawyer representing cli-
ents whose interests are adverse to his client."8 The person who was
kept unaware of the conflict was Doris Green. She was not given a
copy of the letter. At trial, Doris Green was found guilty and sen-
tenced to 280 months (23.3 years) in prison.9
117. Id. app. 26 (Letter from David M. Bohr, Attorney to Jeffrey C. Barker, Attorney
(Feb. 3, 1995)) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
118. By revealing client confidences, an attorney also breaches his or her professional
duty to maintain client confidences. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
119. Personal Restraint Petition, In re the Personal Restraint of Doris Green at 2. See supra
note 40 for a description of other conflict of interest issues in Doris Green's case.
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C. The Problem Defined-The Contract's Inherent
and Irreconcilable Conflicts of Interest
Indigent defense contracts that require the contracting attorney
to pay conflict counsel are not uncommon.' A recent study
reported that three of the thirty-nine counties in Washington State
require the indigent defense contractor to pay conflict counsel;
nine counties have contracts that are so vague it is not possible to
determine who is responsible for paying conflict counsel; and one
county contract is silent as to who is responsible for paying the
costs.11
As discussed in Section III.C.1, this type of contract creates a fi-
nancial disincentive for the contracting attorney to acknowledge a
conflict of interest and seek withdrawal. Since conflict lawyers are
paid out of the lump sum of money received by the contracting
attorney, the contract penalizes the contracting attorney for with-
drawing from a case. Funds that could be used to finance the
contracting attorney's law firm operations are instead diverted to
outside conflict counsel, whose client's interests are in conflict with
the contracting attorney's client's interests. As discussed in Section
III.C.2, the contract also implicates ethical rules on third-party pay-
ment, because the contracting attorney pays for the services of
conflict counsel. The conflicts that arise when a lawyer receives
payment from someone other than the client can only be waived if
the client is made aware of reasonably available alternatives to the
payment "triangle" and gives informed consent. Under the very
terms of the contract, no alternatives are available.
1. Financial Conflicts of Interest-The financial conflict of interest
created by a contract that penalizes indigent defenders for ac-
knowledging conflicts of interest was at the center of the California
case People v. Barboza.12 2 The defendants in Barboza were repre-
sented jointly by attorneys from the office of the Public Defender.
After trial and conviction, they brought an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim asserting that the public defense contract impermis-
sibly created disincentives for the Public Defender to find and
120. See Low-Bid Criminal Defense Contracting, supra note 63, at 24 ("Many contracts re-
quire the contracting attorney to pay substitute counsel when a conflict of interest arises,
creating a disincentive for the contractor to acknowledge a conflict and seek to withdraw.").
121. ACLU OF WASH., THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF GIDEON: WASHINGTON'S FLAWED
SYSTEM OF DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 21 (2004) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/library-files/Unfulfilled%
20Promise%20of%20Gideon.pdf.
122. People v. Barboza, 627 P.2d 188 (Gal. 1981).
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declare conflicts, and that their attorneys were laboring under an
actual conflict of interest as a result of the defendants' joint repre-
sentation. The public defense contract required the Public
Defender to set aside a sum of money in a reserve account each year
to pay conflict counsel. If there was a surplus in the reserve account
at the end of the fiscal year, the funds reverted to the office of the
Public Defender. On the other hand, if there was a deficit in the ac-
count, the office of the Public Defender was liable for the
deficiency.
12 3
The Barboza court found that the "set aside fund" created an ir-
reconcilable conflict of interest, which arose at the moment the
Public Defender was appointed to represent two defendants whose
interests were adverse to each other.1 24 The Court recognized that
the arrangement created a financial disincentive for the Public De-
fender either to investigate or declare the existence of actual or
potential conflicts of interest and placed him in a situation where
his professional and personal financial interests were adverse to the
interests of certain of his clients.
1 25
The Barboza court held, as a 'judicially declared rule of criminal
procedure",26 that the "contract contain[ed] inherent and irrec-
oncilable conflicts of interest," and overturned the defendants'
convictions on that basis.1 2 1 In doing so, the Court avoided the
question of whether the defendants were deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel. Moreover, the Court held that its ruling was
prospective, rather than retroactive, because of the probable reli-
ance upon the validity of the Public Defender contract prior to the
filing of the opinion.9
123. Id. at 189.
124. Id. at 189-90.
125. Id. at 189.
126. Id. at 191 (quoting People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363, 367 (Cal. 1974) and People v.
Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (Cal. 1955)).
127. Id. at 191. For other instances in which the California court has decided cases as a
matter of common law rules of criminal procedure see Rhodes, 524 P.2d at 367-68 (holding
that a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities may not defend or assist in the defense
of persons accused of crimes); People v. Vickers, 503 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Cal. 1972) (finding
that a probationer is entitled to the representation of retained or appointed counsel at for-
mal proceedings for the revocation of probation); Cahan, 282 P.2d at 910-11 (adopting an
exclusionary rule as ajudicially declared rule of evidence prior to the Supreme Court ruling
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule applied to state courts by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment).
128. Barboza, 627 P.2d at 191.
129. Id. Disciplinary proceedings were later brought against the Public Defender. The
Court found he had violated disciplinary rules by failing to obtain written consent of defen-
dants to joint representation, opposing the appointment of outside counsel in a case where
his office had a conflict because ofjoint representation, and adopting an office policy of not
declaring conflicts except when one defendant was to testify against another. The Court
SUMMER 2006]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
As in Barboza, contracts such as the Chelan County contract cre-
ate situations where the personal and financial interests of the
contracting attorney are in conflict with the client's interests.'30 By
agreeing to provide representation in all criminal cases for a lump-
sum of money, the contracting attorney is financially penalized for
acknowledging conflicts and withdrawing from cases. Funds that
could go to support the law firm or to provide legal representation
to clients are diverted to outside sources. Furthermore, contracts
like the Chelan County contract make the indigent defense con-
tractor responsible for the direct employment of conflict counsel,
which creates an additional layer of divided loyalties.
2. Third-Party Payment for Legal Services-A contract that requires
an indigent defense contractor to pay substitute counsel when a
conflict of interest arises invokes the rules of ethics governing
third-party compensation. Rule 1.8(f0 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a cli-
ent from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is pro-
tected as required by Rule 1.6.1''
The risk involved in third-party compensation is "that the lawyer
will serve the interests of the paymaster, rather than those of the
client.' 32 The conflict of interest is multi-faceted; the client's inter-
issued a public reprimand, instead of imposing the State Bar's recommended sanctions of a
thirty-day suspension from practice, stayed on the condition that the attorney be placed on
supervisory probation for one year. See Gendron v. State Bar of Cal., 673 P.2d 260 (Cal.
1983).
130. The California courts have extended the reasoning in Barbozo to disqualify a prose-
cutor's office in a case where a corporate victim paid approximately $13,000 towards
prosecution expenses, finding that the payment created a grave conflict of interest, People v.
Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 321-23 (Cal. 1995), and to overturn a trial court's order that denied
a capital defendant's application for funding to pay for interpreters, experts, transcribers
and investigation, and required his attorney to pay the expenses from a $300,000 fund the
family pooled together for his attorney's fees, Tran v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506,
510-12 (Ct. App. 2001).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2002).
132. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, § 12.13, at 12-33.
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ests may be adverse to the third-party payer, and the lawyer receiv-
ing third-party payment may betray the client in order to gain favor
with the person controlling the purse strings. Thus, a lawyer may
only accept payment from a third party if the client gives informed
consent and agrees to the arrangement. In order to ensure that the
client's consent is truly informed, the attorney must communicate
reasonably adequate information regarding the material risks of
third-party payment, and communicate reasonably available alter-
natives to the proposed course of conduct.
1 3 3
Third-party payment issues arise in civil cases in the context of
prepaid legal services, where salaried government lawyers and cor-
porate counsel also represent individual members of the
organization, and in family arrangements in which parents hire
counsel for their children.1 3 4 They also exist in almost all liability
insurance policies, through the inclusion of a clause by which the
insurer agrees to provide and pay for counsel to represent policy-
holders who are sued or threatened with a suit.13 5 This type of
agreement, found in contracts ranging from car insurance to pro-
fessional malpractice insurance, is often referred to as "the 'eternal
triangle.' 036
Third-party payment "triangles" also arise in cases handled by pri-
vate criminal defense counsel. They can arise when corporations
hire counsel to represent employees, or when municipalities hire
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, 1.0(e) (2002).
134. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 69, §§ 12-13.
135. Id. §§ 12-14.
136. The characterization of the relationship between insurer, insured, and the insur-
ance defense counsel as an "eternal triangle" is not universal.
The relationship is variously referred to as the 'tripartite relationship,' Douglas R.
Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite Relationship Between Insurer, Insured, and
Insurance Defense Counse 73 Neb. L. Rev. 265, 266 (1994); Eric M. Holmes, A Conflicts-
of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a
Net, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 2 (1989); the 'triadic' relationship, Karen 0. Bowdre,
Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and Insured: Ethical Traps for the Unsuspecting Defense
Counsel 17 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 101, 101 (1993); the 'insurance triangle,' STEPHEN
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 273-74 (4th ed.
1995); the 'lovers triangle,' Francis M. Hanna, When Medical Malpractice Becomes Legal
Malpractice: Some of the Dangers Inherent in Representing Professional Malpractice Defendants,
12 Miss. C.L. REv. 73, 76 (1991); and the 'eternal triangle,' Paul M. Vance & Cindy T.
Matherne, Legal Ethics-Defense Counsel's Responsibilities to Insured and Insurer, 6 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 157, 157 (1993); Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the In-
sured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REv. 511 (1991).").
Douglas Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 475, 476 n.1 (1996).
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counsel to represent police officers. 137 The issue most commonly
surfaces in criminal cases involving organized crime, where some-
one other than the defendant pays a lawyer's fees.3 " In these cases,
government attorneys have sought to disclose the identity of the
third party payer 1 9 or petitioned the court to disqualify defense
attorneys.1 40 Even in situations where the employer is involved in a
legitimate business activity, a court must conduct an inquiry to de-
termine whether the employer's interests are divergent from the
employee's interests when the employer pays a defense attorney to
represent an employee.' These problems are so great that one
commentator has suggested "ethical norms require criminal de-
fense lawyers to decline the payment and instead refer the
potential client to a public defender.'
4
The "triangle" dilemma created by the Chelan County contract
raises even more grave ethical concerns. First, the contracting at-
torney employer owes a duty of loyalty to his clients. The provisions
of the contract, however, call this "loyalty to others" into question
at the moment the employer hires employees to represent clients
whose interests are adverse to the employer's clients. The contract-
ing attorney faces two dilemmas: (1) Should he hire an inept
conflict counsel employee in order to protect his own client's in-
terests? (2) Should he place limits on the amount of money his
employee can spend in conflict cases to preserve funds for his own
clients?
43
137. See Roman M. Roxzkewycz, Third Party Payment of Criminal Defense Fees: What Lawyers
Should Tell Potential Clients and Their Benefactors Pursuant to (an Amended) Model Rule 1.8W9, 7
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHiCS 573, 574 (1993).
138. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 560-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (disqualifying coun-
sel upon evidence that defendant had paid counsel to defend others after determining that
evidence of these "benefactor payments" were relevant to whether the benefactor was the
head of the criminal enterprise as defined by RICO).
139. U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1977).
140. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. at 553 (allowing removal of defense counsel where the govern-
ment alleged that they were "'house counsel' to the 'enterprise' charged in the
indictment-the Gambino Organized Crime Family").
141. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981) (remanding the case to determine
whether counsel was actively representing the conflicting interests of the employer, rather
than the employees). See also In reAbrams, 266 A.2d 275, 278 (N.J. 1970) (stating that "it is
... inherently wrong for an attorney who represents only the employee to accept a promise
to pay from one whose criminal liability may turn on the employee's testimony" and deter-
mining that a reprimand was the appropriate discipline for an attorney who accepted
payment for an employee charged with a lottery offense from the employer (a gambler)).
142. David Orentlicher, Fee Payments to Criminal Defense Lawyers ftom Third Parties: Revisit-
ingUnited States v. Hodge and Zweig, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1083, 1084 (2000).
143. Barber & Schneider, With Every Step, supra note 41, at Al (noting that local firms
rejected requests from the indigent defense contractor to represent defendants in the
sex-abuse trials because they were too complex and costly for $90 an hour offered by con-
tractor).
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Second, the contract, for the reasons set forth in the preceding
section, impermissibly creates a situation where the contracting
attorney employer's financial interests, or "loyalty to self," are di-
vergent from the conflict counsel employee's interest in advocating
for her clients. Moreover, the conflict counsel employee's financial
interests, or "loyalty to self," may lead her to betray her client in
order to curry favor with her employer and receive more conflict
144
cases.
Finally, a waiver cannot cure the ethical problems created by the
contract. A client represented by conflict counsel under these cir-
cumstances cannot give informed consent to the third-party
payment as is required under the rules of professional responsibil-
ity.4 5 The client could not be informed about "reasonably available
alternatives" to third-party payment, when there were none. Since
the contract did not provide any alternative means of securing
counsel, if an indigent client refused to waive the payment "trian-
gle" conflict of interest, there would be no method of obtaining
counsel. In short, the conflicts of interest created by the Chelan
County contract, and other similar contracts, are unwavable.
1 4 6
IV. WHY A CLAIM THAT THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CONTRACT
VIOLATED THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WOULD NOT SUCCEED
Despite the entreaties of scholars and the heroic efforts of litiga-
tors, Sixth Amendment challenges to indigent defense contracts
have achieved mixed success. 147 The Sixth Amendment has never
144. The employee/employer relationship created by contracts such as the Chelan
County contract also implicate the duty of confidentiality. See supra note 118 and accompa-
nying text.
145. The Chelan County Contract did not require the contracting attorney to obtain
client consent when hiring conflict counsel. See Barker & Howard Contract, supra note 44, at
1.
146. See e.g., U.S. v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that conflict could
not be waived under the circumstances because "no rational defendant would knowingly
and intelligently be represented by a lawyer whose conduct was guided largely by a desire for
self-preservation" (quoting U.S. v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that con-
flict could not be waived where it arose when defendant's counsel was accused of
participating in criminal activity related to the crimes for which the defendant had been
charged)).
147. See, e.g., Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Miss. 2005) (affirming
dismissal of challenge in Mississippi); Wayne County Criminal Def. Bar Ass'n v. ChiefJudges
of Wayne Circuit Court, 663 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Mich. 2003) (unsuccessful challenge in
Michigan); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (2003) (successful chal-,
lenge in New York); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REv. 2062, 2069-70 & n.55-58 (2000) (discussing successful challenges
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been used as a mechanism to police the ethical behavior of attor-
neys.14 Nor has the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence raised the
quality of representation for indigent defendants. 49 In order to
understand why a Sixth Amendment challenge to the Chelan
County contract would be difficult, it is necessary to briefly review
the doctrine on the right to counsel.
A. Analysis of Sixth Amendment Claims
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a right that involves
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice," and denial of that
right constitutes a violation of due process.' 5° The Gideon court rec-
ognized that defense lawyers are not "luxuries," but rather are
necessary to the fundamental goal of conducting a fair trial.1' In
Gideon, the Court held that an indigent defendant who cannot af-
ford to pay an attorney has an absolute right to have an attorney
appointed by the court.'52 The Supreme Court has also recognized
that a constitutional right to counsel encompasses the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel 5  Whether a defendant was afforded
the constitutional guarantee of counsel is an inquiry that depends
to contracts in Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Connecticut and unsuccess-
ful challenges in Minnesota and New Jersey); Ken Armstrong, Grant County Settles Defense
Lawsuit, SEATrrLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at B1 (successful challenge in Washington); Leonard
Post, Montana Upgrades Indigency Defense System, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 2005, at 4 (stating that in
response to a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Montana legisla-
ture passed The Montana Public Defender Act, creating a statewide public defender system
and an indigent defense commission); Indigents Who Spent Weeks injail Settle, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
21, 2003, at B2 (reporting that lawsuit brought by indigent defendants in Coweta County,
Georgia, was settled when the county agreed to hire more full-time attorneys). At the time of
publication of this Article, class action law suits were also pending in Massachusetts and
Louisiana. See Laura Maggi, Public Defenders Swamped, Suit Says; Prisoners, Poor Face Long Wait
for Lauyers, TIMES-PICAYNE, Sept. 24, 2004, at 4; Jonathan Saltzman, Suit Seeks Pay Raises for
Public Defenders; Ability of Indigent to Get Aid Seen at Risk, BOSTON GLOBE,June 29, 2004, at B1.
148. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) ("[B]reach of an ethical standard does
not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of coun-
sel.").
149. SeeABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 ("[Ilndigent defense ... remains in a state of
crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at con-
stant risk of wrongful conviction.").
150. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926)).
151. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
152. Id. at 344.
153. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("[Tlhe right to counsel is
the right to effective representation of counsel." (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90
(1955))); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444
(1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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upon the nature of the claim of deprivation. Courts apply different
standards of review depending on the specific Sixth Amendment
claim.
1. Presumption of Prejudice: Denial of Counsel and State Interference
with Counsel's Assistance-The Supreme Court has identified a nar-
row group of Sixth Amendment claims in which prejudice to the
defendant is presumed. A presumption of prejudice applies
if there is an actual or constructive denial of assistance of coun-
sel, 5 4 or if the violation results from State interference with
counsel's assistance,' which includes preventing defense counsel
from subjecting the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing. 11 Under these circumstances, prejudice is presumed be-
cause "[p]rejudice ... is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into
prejudice is not worth the cost."15 7
2. Presumption of Effective Representation-Incompetent Counsel
Claims-A claim that defense counsel's performance was deficient
is evaluated under the two-prong test enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington. To prevail on an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish that defense
counsel's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficient performance. 9
Under the performance prong, judicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance is highly deferential. The defendant must show that
154. The total failure to provide counsel will result in an automatic reversal of the con-
viction. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984). Under some circumstances, the
absence of counsel after the initiation of the charge is seen as harmless error. See, e.g., Cole-
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (finding that counsel's absence during
preliminary hearing was subject to harmless error analysis), If counsel is absent during a
"critical stage" of the proceeding, the harmless error doctrine will generally not apply and
prejudice is presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). Courts do not
agree on the question of whether prejudice is presumed when counsel is rendered absent
through sleep. Compare Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1120 (2002) (finding that prejudice must be presumed in a case where the defen-
dant's attorney was repeatedly sleeping during "not insubstantial" portions of the trial case),
with United States v. Cordero, 95 E Supp. 2d 76, 81-82 (D.P.R. 2000) (noting that sleeping
during trial does not constitute prejudice per se, and appearance of sleep may be used by
attorneys as a "strategic tool").
155. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial court ordered the defen-
dant not to consult with his attorney during overnight recess which separated the direct and
cross examination); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (statute allowed trial court to
refuse to permit closing argument in a bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605
(1972) (statute requiring that defendant testify first, or not at all); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365
U.S. 570 (1961) (statute which allowed defendant to make an unsworn statement, but pro-
hibited direct examination of defendant by counsel).
156. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
157. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 691-92.
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counsel's errors were "so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.' 60 The
defendant has the burden of overcoming the "strong presumption"
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in exercise of reasonable professional judgment.16 The
defendant must show that counsel's conduct was outside the range
of competence demanded of criminal defense attorneys, and that
the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness. 62 The courts often resolve claims of incompetence by finding
that an attorney's questionable actions fell within the ambit of trial
strategy.163
Under the prejudice prong, the defendant must establish that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
"fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."' Errors by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, do not warrant setting aside the
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment. To show prejudice in the trial, the defendant must
establish that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 165 If a court can dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
because the defendant failed to establish prejudice, the court may
dismiss the claim without ruling on the question of whether coun-
sel's performance was substandard.' 6 In many cases of egregious
attorney misconduct, the defendant's conviction is affirmed be-
cause the court finds that the defense counsel's incompetence did
not affect the result of the trial.'67
160. Id. at 687.
161. Id.at690.
162. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
163. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (finding that defense counsel's
choice to not present available mitigating evidence in a capital case, and the failure to make
any closing argument or plea for his client's life at the conclusion of the penalty phase, was a
tactical decision about which competent lawyers might disagree).
164. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
165. Id. at 694. Where the defendant pleaded guilty, the defendant can only satisfy the
prejudice prong by demonstrating that, but for counsel's deficient performance, a reason-
able probability exists that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In the context of an appeal, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
failure to consult with defendant about an appeal, defendant would have timely appealed,
or that the result of the appeal would have been different. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
470,484 (2000).
166. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (1984) ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed.").
167. Martin C. Calhoun, Note & Comment, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-
Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. LJ. 413, 430-32
(1988). In a survey of all federal ineffective assistance claims reviewed by the circuit courts of
appeals from the Strickland decision until May 1988, counsel's performance was found rea-
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3. The Murky Middle: Conflict of Interest Claims-The right to
counsel entitles a defendant to the undivided loyalty of his or her
counsel. 168 In Mickens v. Taylor,6 9 the Court agreed that prejudice is
presumed, requiring reversal rather than the Strickland analysis, in
situations where counsel "actively represented conflicting inter-
ests." 70 However, counsel's violation of a provision of the Canons of
Legal Ethics does not, in and of itself, warrant a finding of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 7'
In Mickens, the question before the Court was whether prejudice
was presumed in cases where a trial court was aware of a defense
counsel's conflict of interest, yet failed to conduct an inquiry to
determine whether the conflict precluded representation by coun-
sel. Mickens' lawyer, Bryan Saunders, represented a juvenile on
criminal charges. 73 When the juvenile was murdered, the trial
court dismissed the charges against him due to his death. 74 Four
days later, the same trial judge appointed Saunders to represent
Mickens on the capital charge of causing the death of Saunders'
juvenile client. 75 Saunders did not disclose to Mickens, or to co-
counsel, that he had previously represented the victim. 176 The
Court acknowledged that the trial court had failed in its duty to
inquire into the conflict of interest. 77 However, it held where the
trial court fails to inquire into a "potential" conflict of interest
about which it was aware, the defendant has to establish prejudice
by showing that the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's
performance. The Court affirmed the lower court's finding that
sonable in only 54.3% of the cases. However, only 4.3% ineffectiveness claims resulted in
reversals. Of the remaining claims resolved by a finding that prejudice was not proven, the
court indicated that defense counsel's performance was inadequate in 5.3% of the claims,
while affirming the conviction. Id.
168. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("An actual conflict of interests negates the unimpaired loyalty a defen-
dant is constitutionally entitled to expect and receive from his attorney.").
169. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
170. Id. at 166.
171. Id. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The purpose of our Holloway and Sullivan
exceptions from the ordinary requirements of Strickland, however, is not to enforce the Can-
ons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is
evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) ("[B]reach of an ethical stan-
dard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
assistance of counsel."))).
172. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 164.
173. Id. at 164-65.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 165.
177. Id. at 173-74.
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Mickens had not made the requisite showing of prejudice. 8 Mick-
ens was executed by the state of Virginia on June 12, 2002.2
Many unresolved issues remain when analyzing whether a Sixth
Amendment violation occurs as a result of a conflict of interest.
Courts have developed different standards for determining
whether a conflict is an "actual" conflict (which focuses the inquiry
on whether counsel's performance was affected by the conflict),
versus a "potential" conflict (which subjects the claim to review un-
der Strickland and focuses the inquiry on whether there is a
showing of probable impact on the outcome of the trial).180 At least
one circuit has held that an "actual" conflict of interest can only
arise in cases of multiple or serial representation. Other circuits
reject this narrow approach by extending the category of "actual"
conflicts to cases where there is a financial conflict of interest be-
tween the client and the attorney. The question of whether an
"actual conflict" can be found in cases of successive (versus joint)
representation is, according to Mickens, "an open question."
i 3
Courts have also struggled to define what constitutes an adverse
impact upon representation. Some courts have defined an "actual
conflict" as one that "adversely affects the defense lawyer's per-
formance," making the analysis a one-step inquiry.'8 4 Other courts
have applied a two-part test, holding that the defendant must first
establish an "actual conflict," and then prove that the "actual con-
flict" had an "adverse impact" on representation." The Mickens
178. Id.
179. See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (search for "Walter Mickens") (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
180. See Brief of Legal Ethicists and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 6, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (No. 00-9285)
("[V]arious opinions... reveal a bewildering number of competing concepts [to distinguish
among conflicts]: conflict of interest; actual conflict; technical conflict; potential conflict;
apparent conflict; genuine conflict; actually representing conflicting interests; possible con-
flict; a conflict that never ripened into an actual conflict; a conflict of interest that actually
affected the adequacy of representation; a client actually saddled with a genuine conflict;
and, finally, a conflict of interest that actually existed.").
181. Beets v. Collins, 65 E3d 1258, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (expressing a con-
cern that all defendants would characterize their ineffectiveness claims as conflicts of
interest claims, the court held that Stricklands standard applied to personal conflicts of in-
terest between attorney and client).
182. See, e.g., Amiel v. United States, 209 F3d 195 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Hearst,
638 E2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
183. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176 (KennedyJ., concurring).
184. United States v. Hearst, 638 F2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980).
185. United States v. Schwarz, 283 E3d 76, 92 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The finding of an actual
conflict, however, is only the first step in determining whether Schwarz has established his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He must also show that the actual conflict adversely
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Court appeared to endorse a one-step process by stating that "'an
actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict that affected
counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division
of loyalties.
186
B. Application of the Sixth Amendment to the Contract
It would be difficult to successfully challenge the Chelan County
contract, and other similar contracts, under the Sixth Amendment.
First, Mickens indicates that a heightened level of scrutiny, examin-
ing the effect of the conflict on counsel's performance, can only be
applied in situations where the defense counsel engages in joint
representation of defendants. Even if a reviewing court adopted
the more expansive interpretation of what constitutes an "actual
conflict," the defendant would have to show that the conflict ad-
versely affected counsel's representation. For example, in Cole v.
State, a Florida court found that there was an inherent conflict in
an arrangement where private defense counsel's set fee included
all discovery and investigative fees, since investigation costs would
come out of counsel's pocket.187 However, it affirmed the defen-
dant's conviction because he had not shown the conflict adversely
affected the lawyer's performance. If the reviewing court ruled
that the conflict was merely "potential," challengers would have to
meet Strickland's heightened showing that the outcome of the trial
was affected by counsel's performance. 8 9 Finally, a case-by-case
analysis of an individual client's Sixth Amendment claim would do
little to remedy a systemic problem in contracting for indigent de-
fense.'90
affected [his attorney's] performance by demonstrating that 'a "lapse in representation" re-
sulted from the conflict."' (citations omitted)).
186. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 163.
187. Cole v. State, 700 So. 2d 33, 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied, 705 So. 2d 569
(Fla. 1998).
188. Id.
189. For a critique of the Strickland standard, see Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REv. 1433, 1445-79 (1999).
190. Even if a defendant is able to establish that counsel was ineffective, that individual
will face formidable obstacles in a suit for monetary damages against the lawyer. MeredithJ.
Duncan, Criminal Malpractice A Lawyer's Holiday, 37 GA. L. REv. 1251, 1255 (2003). The
majority of states require plaintiffs in a criminal malpractice suit to obtain post-conviction
relief, either through an acquittal or by vacating the guilty verdict. Johanna M. Hickman,
Recent Developments In The Area Of Criminal Malpractice, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 797, 797-98
(2005). Some courts have held that a reversal of a conviction, in and of itself, is insufficient
proof of criminal malpractice. Compare Ang v. Martin, 114 P.3d 637, 643 (Wash. 2005) (proof
of "actual innocence" by a preponderance of evidence is a necessary element of a criminal
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V. THE APPLICATION OF CONTRACT LAW To
FIXED-FEE CONTRACTS THAT INCLUDE
PAYMENT OF CONFLICT COUNSEL
Indigent defense contracts have not been challenged on the ba-
sis that a clause, or the entire contract, is void on the grounds of
unconscionability or public policy. Nonetheless, the principles of
contract law are not foreign to criminal law. Most criminal cases
are solved through the process of negotiation, resulting in a plea
bargain in which the government and the defendant enter into a
contract.'91 A defendant who pleads guilty gives up certain constitu-
tional rights in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to make a
sentencing recommendation. She gives up the right to trial by
judge or jury, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to
remain silent, the right to be presumed innocent and have the
government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
right to appeal. 192 If a prosecutor fails to comply with terms of the
agreement, the defendant can ask for one of two contractual
remedies-to withdraw from the contract or have the terms of the
contract specifically enforced.'
93
Defendants have sought contractual remedies in cases alleging
that government officials breached their contractual duties to pro-
vide indigent defense. As of yet, no court has addressed the merits
of such a claim. In Mississippi, Quitman County brought a civil ac-
tion for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State alleging,
among other claims, that the State breached its contractual duties
under the Pubic Defender System Act of 1998 to provide a state-
wide, state-funded, public defender system.' 94 The claim was
dismissed as moot because the Public Defender System Act was not
funded by the legislature, and therefore the Act never went into
malpractice lawsuit), with Shaw v. Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (issue of
plaintiff's "actual guilt" is an affirmative defense that must be proven by a preponderance of
evidence by the defendant in a criminal malpractice lawsuit).
191. In 2003, ninety-five percent of all state felony convictions were the result of a guilty
plea. See U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICs 450 (2003).
192. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (noting that pleading guilty impli-
cates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right
to confront one's accusers, and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury). A defendant
may give up additional constitutional rights, such as the right to receive undisclosed excul-
patory impeachment evidence, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002), or the right
to effective assistance of counsel, United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 340-44 (5th Cir.
2002), as part of the plea agreement.
193. Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971).
194. State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 2001).
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effect.9 5 In Georgia, a lawsuit brought by indigent defendants in-
cluded claims against the County Board of Commissions and the
Indigent Defense Committee, alleging that the entities breached
their contractually assumed duties to implement and manage the
indigent defense program established by Coweta County.'9 6 The
county eventually agreed to settle the suit, and hired three full-time
attorneys to cover the work that was previously handled by two
part-time attorneys."' More recently, the state of Georgia passed
the Georgia Indigent Defense Act, which mandates the creation of
forty-nine Public Defender offices, a Mental Health Advocacy Divi-
sion, an office of the Georgia Capital Defender, and the creation of
a council to promulgate guidelines and oversee the work of the
Public Defender offices and appointed conflict defenders.
9 8
The well-established principles of contract law and professional
responsibility can be used as a basis to challenge fixed-fee contracts
that require payment of conflict counsel from the original contract
price. First, the provisions of such contracts violate the canons of
ethics. As described Section III.C.1, the contracting attorney is
placed in a situation where the attorney's personal and financial
interests in declaring conflicts and paying for substitute counsel
are divergent from the client's interests, creating an inherently ir-
reconcilable conflict. Second, as discussed Section III.C.2, the
provision for third-party payment of conflict counsel from the
fixed-fee contract also creates a multi-layered division of loyalties
that cannot be cured through a waiver. As described below, these
circumstances translate into a contract that is unconscionable, or
contrary to public policy.
A. The Principle of Unconscionability
The principle of unconscionability has its historical pinning in
early common law. A contract was considered unconscionable if it
195. Id. at 404. At trial after remand, the trial court ruled on the lawsuit's remaining
constitutional claim. It found that Quitman County had not met its burden of proving that
the funding mechanism established by statute had led to systemic ineffective assistance of
counsel in Quitman County and throughout the state. The Mississippi Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's ruling. See Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032 (Miss. 2005).
196. See Complaint and Petition for Mandamus, Bowling v. Lee, No. 01-V-802 (Ga. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://schr.org/news/docs/complaintfinal.pdf.
197. Indigents Who Spent Weeks in Jail Settle, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 2003, at B2.
198. Marion Chartoff, Indigent Defense: The Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, CHAM-
PION, Aug. 2003, at 61.
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was "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would
accept on the other." 99 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides
that a court may refuse to enforce a contract, or a term in a
contract, or it may limit the terms of the contract, on the grounds
of unconscionability.2m The Uniform Commercial Code contains similar
language,' and although its provisions only apply to the sale of
goods, not services, it has been influential in guiding an analysis of
the doctrine of unconscionability.
20 2
Determining what constitutes an unconscionable term or con-
tract is a task that reaches towards philosophical and ethical
notions of justicey, and is the subject of extensive scholarly de-
bate.0 4 Arthur Leff was the first to introduce an analytical
framework for analyzing unconscionability within the commercial
setting, which distinguished between procedural unconscionability
and substantive unconscionability.2 5 Procedural unconscionability
addresses the process of contract formation, and examines what
took place between the parties when the contract was made, while
substantive unconscionability deals with the resulting content of
the contract.20 6 In defining unconscionability, courts have used
199. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 199 (Ch.)).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
201. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005).
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 reporter's note, cmt. a (1981)
("Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 is literally inapplicable to contracts not involving the
sale of goods, but it has proven very influential in non-sales cases. It has many times been
used either by analogy or because it was felt to embody a generally accepted social attitude
of fairness going beyond its statutory application to sales of goods."). See also Honey Dew
Assocs. v. M & K Food Corp., 241 F.3d 23, 28 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Massachusetts courts deal-
ing with claims of unconscionable contract terms have recognized the relevance of the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions in analyzing the claims before them even if the con-
tract was not covered by the Code."); Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 145 (Mont. 1989)
(noting that the unconscionability standard applied to sales transactions is also used by
courts to determine unconscionability of release in a personal injury case resulting from an
automobile accident).
203. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 372 (4th ed.
1998) ("'Unconscionable' is word that defies lawyer-like definition. It is a term borrowed
from moral philosophy and ethics.").
204. See John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion, The German Version, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1041, 1042-44 (1976) (discussing comparative analysis of unconscionability doctrine);
Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.CC.
Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1981) (reviewing scholarship on the doctrine of uncon-
scionability).
205. SeeArthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and The Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967).
206. See, e.g., id. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
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such colorful language as "shock[ing to] the conscience, mon-
strously harsh, 2 08 "outrageous, ' '2°9 or "exceedingly calloused. 21 0
B. Contracts that Violate Public Policy
Many courts rely upon grounds of public policy, as well as un-
conscionability, to void contracts or terms of a contract.2" The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 provides that a contract or
term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation
provides that it is unenforceable, or if the public policy against en-
forcement clearly outweighs the interest in enforcement. 212 When
conducting an analysis under § 178, courts are less concerned with
the relative bargaining strengths, or procedural unconscionability,
of the parties to the contract. A contract provision, even if it is ne-
gotiated at "arms length" between two parties of equal status, may
be unenforceable on public policy grounds.13 When analyzing
whether public policy weighs against the enforcement of a con-
tract, a reviewing court may examine legislation relevant to the
policy, or rely on the need to protect the public welfare against
harms such as restraint of trade, impairment of domestic relations,
or interference with other protected interests.214
1. Violation of the Rules of Ethics--Contracts that violate the can-
ons of legal ethics have been voided on public policy grounds.
Courts have voided contracts that provide for a fee splitting
agreement between an attorney and a non-attorney,1" contracts
that call for a non-attorney to engage in the unauthorized practice
207. Hillman, supra note 204, at 26 (suggesting that the definition "shock the con-
science" is frequently employed by the equity courts).
208. Jeffery v. Weintraub, 648 P.2d 914, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Annuity Bd. Of S. Baptist Convention, 556 P.2d 552 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976)).
209. Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (citing Orlett v. Subur-
ban Propane, 561 N.E.2d 1066, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)).
210. Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (quoting Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Annuity Bd. of S. Baptist Convention, 556 P.2d 552 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)).
211. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1266 (Alaska 1986)
(finding that limited liability provision in advertising contract with a telephone utility and
directories corporation was unconscionable and void as against public policy).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Even
arms length negotiated commercial contracts between persons of equal power are void if
they offend public policy.").
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981).
215. SeeTrotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 1997).
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of law,21 6 or those providing for a contingency fee in a criminal217
case. An area of debate exists as to whether a non-competition
clause in an employment contract or partnership agreement that
restricts the right of an attorney to compete with a former law firmS2181
or partnership is void on public policy grounds. Courts have
found these covenants unenforceable not only on the grounds that
they interfere with the lawyer's right to practice law, but also that
they restrict a client or potential client's choice of counsel.2 1 9 Thus,
the courts recognize the impact of the restrictive covenant upon
the third-party beneficiaries of the attorney's expertise: clients and
potential clients.
2. Interfering with Rights of Third Parties--Courts have invalidated
clauses in contracts when the parties involved in the contract nego-
tiated a clause that interfered with the rights of individuals affected
by, but not involved in, the negotiation of the contract. Provisions
that interfere with the public right to exercise important funda-
mental constitutional rights have been held unenforceable on
public policy grounds. Thus, provisions in civil settlement agree-
ments 0 and in plea bargains22 1 which prohibit one of the parties
from running for elected office were voided on the ground that
the clause interfered with the constitutional right of voters to elect
their public officials.
Courts have also voided contracts that interfered with other im-
portant, but not constitutional, rights of third parties to the
contract. Certain agreements not to prosecute, such as release-
216. See Nat'l Realty Counselors, Inc. v. Tracy, Inc., 713 A.2d 524, 525 (N.J. 1998).
217. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Bane, 431 N.E.2d 190,193 (Mass. 1982).
218. See Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While Maintaining
the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. L. Rev. 915, 922 (2000)
("[R]ecent practice of rejecting non-competition agreements among lawyers on essentially a
per se basis is inappropriate and should give way to a more traditional rule of reason analysis
that considers adequately the nature of the law firm's asserted interests, whether those inter-
ests would be compromised unfairly by competition from a departing lawyer, and whether
the firm, by entering into a non-competition agreement, has improperly put its interests
before those of any person to whom it owes a fiduciary duty.").
219. See, e.g., Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 687 N.E.2d 1237, 1239-40 (Mass.
1997) (discussing how non-competition agreements between lawyers are of concern because
of the need to protect the clients and potential clients of the withdrawing lawyer and the law
firm and noting that "[aln enforceable forfeiture-for-competition clause would tend to dis-
courage a lawyer who leaves a firm from competing with it. This in turn would tend to
restrict a client or potential client's choice of counsel").
220. See Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1252 (1991) (striking down civil settlement because it interfered with
the party's constitutional right to run for office and the constitutional right of the voters to
elect him to public office).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Richmond, 550 E Supp. 605, 609 .(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (striking
down a plea agreement because it interfered with the people's right to elect their represen-
tative).
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dismissal agreements, may be unenforceable because of their im-
pact on important public policy issues. According to the Supreme
Court's decision in Town of Newton v. Rumery,222 reviewing courts
must determine whether the interest in enforcing a release-dismissal
agreement outweighs the public policy harmed by enforcement of
the agreement.22 3 Courts have invalidated release-dismissal agree-
ments in cases when the prosecutor does not engage in any
individualized analysis of a case, but rather imposes a blanket policy
of requiring release-dismissal agreements. 2 4 Courts have denied
summary judgment when the circumstances indicate there were
genuine issues of material fact over whether the agreement was vol-
225untary. Public policy considerations prohibit courts from
enforcing release-agreements made between private individuals or
entities, since private citizens cannot contract away the public's
right to bring criminal charges against someone who commits a
226
crime.
VI. BAR ASSOCIATIONS' ROLE IN CHALLENGING INDIGENT
DEFENSE CONTRACTS THAT ARE UNCONSCIONABLE
OR AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
A claim that a contract, or contractual provision, is unconscion-
able or contrary to public policy is generally raised as a defense to a
lawsuit.2 7 However, it is unlikely that the parties to the Chelan
222. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
223. Id. at 391-92.
224. See Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 382 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1195 (1994) (holding prosecutor's office blanket policy of requiring release-dismissal
agreements for candidates participating in a program which led to dismissal of charges was
contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable); Kinney v. City of Cleveland, 144 F
Supp. 2d 908, 917-19 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that blanket nature of the release re-
quirement, which made no attempt to distinguish between frivolous and meritorious
litigation, rendered the agreements unenforceable); Cowles v. Brownell, 538 N.E.2d 325,
330 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the prosecutor's routine demand of waivers to protect a police
officer whose misdeeds it knew engendered an appearance of impropriety or conflict of
interest and mitigated against enforcing the release agreement).
225. See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1211-15 (3rd
Cir. 1993) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs
had made deliberate, informed, and voluntary waiver of right to bring civil action against
officers and municipalities in return for dismissal of criminal charges against plaintiff pre-
cluded summary judgment against plaintiffs on ground of release).
226. See, e.g., Y.W. v. Nat'l Super Markets, Inc., 876 S.W.2d 785, 790-91 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
227. Williams v. Cent. Money Co., 974 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1997) ("The claim of
common law unconscionability appears to apply only defensively, for example, as a response
to an attempt to enforce a contract.").
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County contract and other similar contracts would raise this de-
fense in a suit for breach of contract. In other words, the indigent
defense contractor would not be inclined to refuse payment for
services rendered by conflict counsel, and would avoid claiming
that the conflict of interest clause was unconscionable or contrary
to public policy. Such an action would subject the contracting law-
yer, who entered into the agreement to pay for conflict counsel
under the terms of the contract, to explain why she entered into a
contract that she believed was unconscionable. Although the indi-
gent defense contract is for the provision of services that benefit
third parties-indigent defendants-it is equally unlikely that indi-
gent defendants would bring a lawsuit challenging the provisions
of the contract. The indigent defendant could assert rights as
third-party beneficiary to the contract.228 However, a person who
lacks the resources necessary to hire a lawyer in a criminal case will
presumably lack the resources to bring a lawsuit against the indi-
gent defense attorney or the government.
Bar associations, which exist in every state, 229have taken leading
roles advocating for improved indigent defense services, and are
uniquely positioned to challenge contracts such as the one found
in Chelan County.23 0 QuintinJohnstone examined the activities and
missions of state and local bar associations and concluded that all
share the goals of benefiting individual lawyers, the legal profes-
sion, and the public at large.23' Certainly the mission of ensuring
that individuals receive competent, adequate representation that is
free from conflicts of interest falls squarely within these shared
goals.232 State bar associations are situated to use their resources to
ensure that members of their profession do not enter into indigent
defense contracts that violate the canons of professional responsi-
bility. The state bar associations can pursue this mission through
education, advisory opinions, disciplinary proceedings, and litiga-
tion.
228. See generally 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37 (4th ed. 2000)
(discussing the rights of third party beneficiaries of contracts to seek injunctions or equita-
ble relief to enforce their rights under the contracts).
229. See QuintinJohnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performances, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 193, 195-96 (1996).
230. See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-35 (discussing strategies for reform and the
role of state bar associations in improving indigent defense services).
231. Johnstone, supra note 229, at 195-96.
232. As such, a bar association's efforts on behalf of indigent defense reform fall outside
of the activities prohibited by Keller v. State Bar of California. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496
U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (holding that a bar association that charges mandatory dues may only use
those dues to fund activities consistent with the purposes of the association, such as regulat-
ing the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services).
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A. Education
State bar associations can become active, or continue in their ef-
forts to educate the public regarding the need for indigent defense
services reform. Bar associations can convene committees that de-
tail the problems of the indigent defense system, recommend
improvements to the system, and work with local and state gov-
ernments to ensure that indigent defense contracts comply with
the canons of professional responsibility. The associations can be
active in legislative sessions, meeting with legislators, or testifying at
legislative hearings in support of the association's position for in-
digent defense reform.
B. Advisory Opinions
State bar associations are often asked to issue advisory opinions
to resolve ethical dilemmas. In a case involving the provision of
indigent defense services, the state bar of Texas was asked to issue
an opinion on whether it was permissible for a lawyer to participate
in an "attorney of the day" program where an attorney received
payment for representation at an arraignment calendar only in the
event the defendant elected to plead guilty.233 The opinion noted
that the program presented the lawyer with a potential conflict, by
pitting the interests of the attorney in obtaining a fee, against the
interests of the client which may or may not be served by pleading
guilty. The bar concluded that it would seem highly unlikely that,
with the time constraints that would exist, the lawyer could on the
day of the consultation provide 'full disclosure' to the criminal de-
fendant concerning the conflict of interest and its implications,
obtain a valid consent from the criminal defendant, and then
counsel with the criminal defendant as to whether the criminal
defendant should plead guilty.2 4 Because the scenario presented a
conflict of interest that could not be waived by informed consent,
the opinion concluded that the state rules of professional respon-
235
sibility prohibited an attorney from participating in the program.
Contracts such as the Chelan County contract raise ethical issues
similar to those addressed by the Texas State Bar Association. As
233. Tex. Sup. Ct. Prof l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 535, 64 TEx. B.J. 78 (Jan. 2001) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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discussed in Section III(C) (2), the contract presents a multi-
faceted division of loyalties between the contracting attorney, con-
flict counsel, and their clients, which cannot be waived through the
process of informed consent. Individual members of a state bar
could request that their state bar associations issue advisory opin-
ions regarding the permissibility of entering into such contracts
under the rules of professional responsibility. Although the opin-
ions are only advisory in nature, they would forewarn lawyers
regarding the consequences of undertaking contractual obliga-
tions that violate the rules of professional responsibility.236
C. Rules of Professional Responsibility
All states prohibit lawyers from undertaking specific types of
representation or engaging in business transactions that present
impermissible conflicts of interest.2 7 State rules of professional re-
sponsibility could be amended to unequivocally prohibit lawyers
from entering into indigent defense contracts where the contract-
ing attorney agrees to pay for conflict counsel, or from accepting
compensation as conflict counsel under such a contract. For ex-
ample, Model Rules of Professional Responsibility could read:
1.8 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules
(1) A lawyer shall not:
(1) make an agreement with a governmental entity for the de-
livery of indigent criminal defense services unless the terms of
the agreement obligate the governmental entity to compen-
sate conflict counsel for fees and expenses independent of the
agreement; or
236. In 1995, the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the Washington State
Bar Association issued an Informal Opinion addressing the question of whether conflicts of
interest arose when a public defender office was required to pay for conflict attorneys out of
the public defense contract. WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, INFORMAL OPINION: 1647 (1995),
http://pro.wsba.org/io/print.asp?ID=729 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). The Committee opined that the plan raised issues under the rules govern-
ing conflict of interest, third-party payment, and maintaining confidentiality. Id. However,
informal opinions do not represent the official opinion of the Washington State Bar Associa-
tion. Id.
237. See supra note 68.
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(2) accept compensation for the delivery of indigent criminal
defense services from a lawyer who has entered into an
agreement in violation of paragraph (1) (1).
Incorporating a prohibition against the above agreements into the
rules of professional responsibility serves two purposes. First, law-
yers are put on notice that agreeing to pay for conflict counsel out
of an indigent defense contract budget unquestionably violates the
rules of ethics. Second, a rule of professional responsibility prohib-
iting a lawyer from entering into such agreements will provide
clear guidelines to government entities engaging in negotiations
for indigent defense contracts. If a government entity proposes
that the contracting attorney pay for conflict counsel, the proposal
will be rejected on the ground that the agreement will subject the
attorney to disciplinary proceedings.
D. Disciplinary Proceedings
Currently, state supreme courts govern the regulation of lawyers
in all fifty states.238 Bar associations can pursue disciplinary pro-
ceedings against contracting attorneys who enter into contracts
that violate the canons of professional responsibility. Indeed, after
People v. Barboza was decided, disciplinary proceedings were
brought against the public defender involved in the case. 239 The
court found he had violated disciplinary rules by failing to obtain
the defendants' written consent to joint representation, opposing
the appointment of outside counsel in a case where his office had a
conflict because of joint representation, and adopting an office
policy of not declaring conflicts except when one defendant was to
testify against another. The state bar recommended sanctions: a
thirty-day suspension from practice, stayed on the condition that
the attorney be placed on supervisory probation for one year.
However, the court issued a public reprimand through its opinion,/ 1 • 240
rather than imposing the bar's recommendation.
More severe sanctions were imposed against indigent defense
providers in Washington State. A lawyer who provided indigent de-
fense services for many years in Grant County was disbarred upon
238. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation--Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167, 1171
(2003).
239. See Gendron v. State Bar of Cal., 673 P.2d 260 (Cal. 1983).
240. Id. at 270.
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proof that he charged clients fees while also representing them as
court-appointed criminal defense counsel, failed to explain the
choice between appointed counsel and retained counsel, charged
unreasonable fees, and voluntarily maintained an excessive
caseload.2 4' Another attorney from the same county was also dis-
barred for numerous acts of misconduct, including asking for
payment from court-appointed clients over a six-year period of
242providing indigent defense services.
E. Litigation
Litigation is not the first choice of action to use to dissuade gov-
ernment entities-whether state, county, or municipalities-from
entering into indigent defense contracts that are unconscionable
or contrary to public policy. However, litigation is an avenue that
can be pursued in order to effectuate change that does not come
about through the process of education and collaboration.
Bar associations have sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
primarily in litigation regarding the unauthorized practice of law,
in order to protect the legal profession and to protect the public at241
large. State bar associations have brought actions against real es-
tate appraisers, seeking injunctive relief on the grounds that the
non-attorney appraiser engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law when representing a taxpayer in a property tax appeal. 24 They
have brought actions challenging a state public utilities commis-
sion agency ruling that allowed non-attorneys to act in a
241representative capacity in proceedings before the commission.
241. See Washington State Bar Association Discipline Notice, http://pro.wsba.org/
PublicView-Discipline.asp?UsrDiscipline..D=594. (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform).
242. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 94 P.3d 939 (Wash. 2004).
243. Bar associations have also served as amicus curiae to promote improved civil legal
services for the poor because that mission serves the interest of their associations. See Brown
v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
244. See, e.g., State ex reL Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Miller, 770 N.E.2d 328, 328-30 (Ind.
2002) (rejecting bar association's request for permanent injunction against non-attorney
appraiser representing taxpayers in property tax appeals before State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners, since rules governing representation by non-attorneys before Board, which were
passed after appraiser's representation, appeared to address bar association's concerns).
245. See Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172-73
(Idaho 1981) (holding that the Commission did not have the authority to promulgate rules
empowering non-attorneys to act in a representative capacity before the Commission, except
to the extent of allowing representation of a sole proprietorship by the owner, or represen-
tation of a partnership by the partners, or representation of a corporation or non-profit
organization by the officers of those entities).
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They have sought declaratory and injunctive relief against lenders
who charged a fee for selection, preparation, or drafting of loan
documents and deeds between the purchaser and seller.246 They
have even brought suits to prevent a divorce center from selling
"do-it-yourself" divorce kits, alleging that the sales constituted un-
authorized practice of law.247
In Nevada, the State Bar's lawsuit against a typing service for the
unauthorized practice of law brought significant legal reform in
the provision of civil legal services for the poor. The typing service
appealed from an injunction obtained by the State Bar, claiming
that its unauthorized practice of law fell within the state's "public
necessity" exception . 4 The typing service argued that because the
injunction forbade it from providing any assistance other than ver-
batim typing services, "indigent, lower and middle class persons,
the mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, the self-reliant pro
se person and other litigants who cannot afford or can not obtain
the services of an attorney" were required to elect to hire an attor-
ney or forgo legal services in connection with their action.
Although the court did not lift the injunction, it ordered the State
Bar to investigate the alleged unavailability of legal services for low
and middle-income Nevadans. 2 0 The investigation resulted in mak-
ing a lawyer's pro bono responsibilities more specific through the
revision of the Supreme Court rule governing public service work,
in the formation of a statewide pro bono program, and in the crea-
251tion of the State Bar Access to Justice Committee.
These efforts suggest that bar associations pursue litigation when
the ends of litigation are consistent with their mission. The associa-
tions' litigation against individuals engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law is justified on the ground that litigation is necessary
246. See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 113 S.W3d 105, 121-22
(Ky. 2003) (issuing advisory opinion stating that laypersons may conduct real estate closings,
but may not answer legal questions, or offer legal advice during closing process); Toledo Bar
Ass'n v. Chelsea Title Agency of Dayton, Inc., 800 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ohio 2003) (granting bar
association's request to enjoin fitle insurance agency from preparing warranty and quitclaim
deeds).
247. See N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Ctr. of Atlantic County, 477 A.2d 415, 421-23
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Divc 1984) (holding that sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits did not consti-
tute the unauthorized practice of law, though the sellers did engage in the unauthorized
practice of law when they explained or recommended particular forms and made judgments
as to how an individual should fill out the form). See also Fla. Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808,
809 (Fla. 1984) (holding in contempt nonlawyer who prepared pleadings and gave legal
advice on family law matters after being enjoined from doing so).
248. Greenwell v. State Bar, 836 P.2d 70 (Nev. 1992).
249. Id. at 71.
250. Id. at 71-72.
251. See Access to Justice Grows from UPL Case, NEVADA LAW., Feb. 1997, at 16.
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to protect the public against the possibility of receiving incompe-
tent or dishonest advice from laypersons. 2 It is equally important
to protect the public against the incompetent and unethical con-
duct of attorneys. Undertaking litigation to fight for the rights of
poor people who stand accused of crimes is a noble endeavor in
keeping with the goals of bar associations. These individuals are
vulnerable, not only as a result of their poverty, but also because of
the criminal charges made by the government. In order to en-
hance the reputation of lawyers, and to protect the legal profession
and the public against unethical conduct, bar associations should
contemplate seeking injunctive or declaratory relief to prevent at-
torneys from contracting for indigent defense services in a manner
that is unconscionable and against public policy.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion that we are suffering an "indigent defense crisis"
is reached so consistently by those examining the provision of ser-
vices, that it is almost a clich6. And yet, there are countless
instances of extraordinary efforts by lawyers representing indigent
defendants that take place on a daily basis in courts across the
United States. It was my privilege to be involved in the efforts of
such lawyers and law students from the Innocence Project North-
west, whose volunteer efforts succeeded in obtaining the release of
clients convicted in the Wenatchee sex-ring investigations. Of the
thirteen individuals represented by IPNW, ten were released
through the efforts of the legal teams, and three served out their
sentences. Doris Green was freed after serving five years in
prison.253
Practitioners and scholars continue to advocate reform in indi-
gent defense services, whether through the courts2 54 or through
legislative efforts,2 55 in order that every person who is too poor to
afford a lawyer can have his or her constitutional rights champi-
252. The public perception that bar associations are merely protecting their own inter-
ests in maintaining a monopoly on legal practice by bringing such suits has led to a decline
in the past twenty years of bar associations undertaking actions against the unauthorized
practice of law. See Johnstone, supra note 229, at 220.
253. SeeMcMurtrie, supra note 25, at 18.
254. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery
of CriminalDefense Services, 63 U. Prrr. L. REv. 293 (2002).
255. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IowA L. REV. 219 (2004) (suggesting that resource parity will not come
from the courts acting alone, without the assistance of the legislature).
[VOL. 39:4
SUMMER 2006] Unconscionable Contracting for Indigent Defense 821
oned by able counsel. This Article suggests using challenges based
on contract theory to supplement, not supplant, the constitutional
claims organizations have brought. The constitutional right to
counsel jurisprudence establishes that a lawyer's breach of ethical
standards in the provision of indigent defense services cannot nec-
essarily be remedied through constitutional challenge. When
contracts for indigent defense include clauses that violate the rules
of professional responsibility, they are subject to challenge under
the contract theories of unconscionability or public policy. If bar
associations embark upon such challenges, it will be a step towards
improving the indigent defense system and protecting the public
against the incompetent and unethical conduct of lawyers. As the
Wenatchee cases poignantly illustrate, this needed reform will also
be one step towards protecting the innocent from conviction.

